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The  Italo -Turkish  War 

(1911-12.) 


Translated  and  Compiled  from  the  Reports  of  the 
Italian  General  Staff 


BY 


FIRST  LIEUT.  RENATO  TITTONI, 
U.  S.  M.  C. 

July,  1913. 


Kansas  City,  Missouri,  U.  S.  A., 

FRANKLIN  HUDSON  PUBLISHING  COMPANY, 

1914. 

Copyrighted  1914,  by 

Franklin  Hudson  Publishing  Co., 

Kansas  City,  Mo.,  U.  S.  A. 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 


Notes. 

Sapper — A  soldier  employed  in  building  fortifications. 

Class  of  i88q,  1890,  etc. — The  males  are  called  to  colors 
when  twenty  years  of  age,  and  are  classified  according  to 
the  year  they  were  born. 

Ascari  and  Meharisti — Native  troops  from  Italy's 
African  possessions. 

Spotters — Officers  detailed  to  watch  the  fall  of  the 
shots\round'the  target  and  report  the  results  in  order  to 
keep  in  range. 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 


CONTENTS. 


Preface, 9 

The  Mobilization, 11 

Military  Operations 21 

The  First  Occupations, 25 

Combats  of  Henni-Sciara  and  Sciat  Henni-Bu  Melina, .   26 
Occupation  of  Tobruk,  Derna,  Bengasi,  and  Horns,     .   29 

Establishment  of  Bases, 30 

Zone  of  Tripoli, 30 

Combats  of  Hamidiè  and  Renni-Messri, 30 

Combat  and  Occupation  of  Ain  Zara, 33 

Reconnaissance, 37 

Battle  and  Occupation  of  Gargaresc, 37 

Second  Combat  at  Ain  Zara, 38 

Zone  of  Homs, 38 

Reconnaissance  of  Lebda, 38 

Combat  and  Occupation  of  Mergheb, 39 

Night  Combat  of  Mergheb,  39 

Zone  of  Bengasi, 40 

Combat  of  Koefia, 40 

Defense  of  Bengasi, 43 

Battle  of  Suani  el  Rani  or  "Due  Palme,"     ....  44 

Zone  of  Derna, 48 

Defense  of  the  Redoubts  of  Lombardia  and  Calabria,    .   51 
Intensification  of  the  War  in  Libya  and  the  iEgean,   ...   52 

Zone  of  Zuara, 52 

Landing  at  Macabez, 52 

Operations  for  the  Occupation  of  Sidi  Said,        •      •      •   55 

Battle  of  Sidi  Ali, 57 

Occupation  of  Zuara, 58 

Combat  and  Occupation  of  Regdaline, 61 

Operations  in  the  ^gean, 62 

Expedition  to  Rhodes, 62 

Landing  at  Kalitheas  and  the  Battle  of  Asgum,      .      .   65 
Battle  of  Psitos, 65 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 


CONTENTS— Continued. 


Zone  of  Homs, 67 

Battle  and  Occupation  of  Lebda, 67 

Battle  of  the  Monticelli  di  Lebda, 67 

Zone  of  Misurata, 71 

Battle  and  Occupation  of  Misurata, 71 

Battle  of  Gheran, 72 

Zone  of  Derna, 72 

Advance  on  Sidi  Abdallah  IL, 72 

Battle  of  Kasr  Ras  el  Leben, 75 

Battles  of  Sidi  Abdallah  IIL  and  Braksada, ...  76 

Zone  of  Tripoli, 77 

Battle  of  Sidi  Abdul-Gilil  or  Zanzur, 77 

Battle  of  Sidi  Bilal, 78 

Zone  of  Tobruk, 81 

Table  of  Losses  in  the  Principal  Actions, 82 

The  Various  Arms, 85 

The  Artillery, 93 

Engineer  Corps, 94 

Sanitary  Service, 103 

Commissary  Department, 104 

Transportation, 107 

Veterinary  Service, 109 

Postal  Service, no 

The  Civil  Administration  and  Its  PoUcy,        .      .      .      .  113 

Landing-places, 114 

Survey, 114 

Roads,  Streets,  and  Railways, 117 

Telegraph  and  Telephone, 121 

Water  Mains, 122 

Sanitary  and  Hygienic  Measures, 123 

Various  Services, 127 

Conclusion, 131 


Tiai'uLl.— Italian  1  lag  Kai.su(i  on  the  Castle,  October  ó,  I'Jll. 


'5 


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THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 


PREFACE. 

The  various  correspondents  of  Italian  newspapers 
have  narrated  from  time  to  time,  while  under  the  imme- 
diate impression  of  facts,  the  singular  events  of  our  recent 
war,  with  patriotic  zeal  and  brilliant  and  colored  style. 
They  have  also  referred  to  the  civil  administration  and 
the  policy  pursued  in  Libya  and  the  j^gean  by  the  Army 
and  Navy;  also,  with  less  detail,  on  account  of  the  lack  of 
data  and  newspaper  conservatism,  on  the  operation  of  the 
mobilization,  the  complicated  work  of  rendering  secure 
the  bases  and  constantly  maintaining  the  troops  at  a 
high  standard  of  efficiency. 

Therefore,  in  order  to  get  a  clear  and  complete  account 
of  the  war,  it  seemed  wiser  to  compile  a  brief  report  of  all 
the  actions  of  the  troops  and  to  treat  successively  the 
mobilization,  military  operations,  and  civil  administra- 
tion and  its  policy,  which  the  military  authorities  could 
execute  with  the  cordial  and  efficacious  cooperation  of  the 
civil  personnel,  called  into  the  colonies  after  the  first 
months  of  the  war. 

This  publication  is,  therefore,  a  summary  of  the  official 
actions  during  the  Italo-Turkish  War. 


ANNOUNCEMENT. 

The  publishers  desire  to  express  their  great  ap- 
preciation of  the  courtesy  of  the  ItaHan  Government,  in 
permitting  the  use  in  this  volume  of  the  illustrations  as 
published  in  the  orginal  report  to  their  Government. 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  ii 

CHAPTER  I. 
The  Mobilization. 

The  Tripolitan  Question  had  been  agitated  a  long 
time  in  Italy,  but  public  opinion  became  largely  interested 
only  after  the  commencement  of  the  Young  Turkish 
regime,  which  started  to  interfere  with  and  continually 
placed  obstacles  to  the  pacific  development  of  commerce, 
industries,  and  anything  else  of  Itahan  initiative,  not 
only  in  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica,  but,  it  may  be  said,  in 
every  other  locality  of  the  Turkish  Empire. 

A  rapid  survey  of  the  Moroccan  Question,  for  the 
purpose  of  arriving  at  a  definite  solution,  showed  that  the 
importance  of  our  status  in  the  Mediterranean  was  les- 
sened, and  that  to  insure  the  rights  of  Italy  in  Tripoli  we 
had  to  have  a  sphere  of  influence  and  pursue  a  policy 
adequate  to  our  maritime  interests. 

Our  Government  made  demands  of  the  Porte,  and, 
awaiting  a  reply,  resolved  to  prepare  a  military  expedition, 
in  order  to  show  Turkey  the  firm  intention  of  Italy  not  to 
see  her  prestige  as  a  great  power  diminished  and  to  insure 
the  recognition  of  her  rights  by  the  other  nations. 

The  special  mobilization  which  followed  was  the  first 
experience  of  this  kind  for  our  troops  on  an  extensive 
scale  since  the  campaign  for  the  union  of  It^y.  In  the 
patient  work  of  organization  and  preparation,  the  mih- 
tary  authorities  had  to  keep  in  mind,  aside  from  the  par- 


12  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

ticular  exigency  requiring  this  expedition,  the  necessity  of 
not  interfering  with  an  eventual  general  mobilization  of 
the  troops,  following  that  of  each  special  body.  In  line 
with  the  above  condition,  it  was  proposed  to  assemble 
an  expeditionary  corps  consisting  of  all  arms  (Infantry, 
Cavalry,  Artillery,  Hospital,  and  Subsistence  Corps), 
drafts  from  the  various  territorial  troops,  and  to  de- 
tail for  service  the  Second  Reserve.  There  had  to  be 
obtained  special  materiel  and  various  means  for  light 
transportation,  which  had  to  be  substituted  for  regula- 
tion materiel  and  regular  transportation  facilities,  with 
the  exception  of  the  carriages  and  caissons  of  the  Field 
Artillery. 

To  diminish  the  work  of  the  Sanitary  Corps,  part  of 
the  Red  Cross  Association  was  assigned  to  the  regular 
troops  to  maintain  ambulances  and  field  hospitals. 

It  was  decided  that,  as  soon  as  the  special  mobilization 
was  completed,  the  Staff  should  replace  immediately  the 
personnel  and  materiel  taken  from  the  forces  available 
for  a  general  mobilization. 

The  Expeditionary  Force  consisted  of  the  following: 
2  divisions  (ist  and  2d),  each  consisting  of  2  brigades 
and  each  brigade  of  2  regiments,  with  Machine  Gun  pla- 
toons; 2  squadrons  of  Cavalry;  i  regiment  of  Field  Ar- 
tillery, consisting  of  4  batteries  of  75-A  (3-in.);  i  com- 
pany of  sappers;  wagon  and  pack  transportation. 

Supplementary  Troops:  2  regiments  of  Bersagliere 
(Infantry),  with  Machine  Gun  platoon;  i  regiment  of 
Field  Artilley  (4  batteries);  2  companies  of  Coast  Ar- 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  13 

tillery;  2  companies  of  sappers;  i  company  of  Signal 
Corps;  4  field  radio  stations;  wagon  and  pack  transpor- 
tation; Red  Cross  Association.  The  Second  Reserve 
was  held  in  readiness. 

Total  Expeditionary  Force:  34,000  men,  6,300  horses 
and  mules,  1,050  wagons,  48  field  guns,  24  mountain  guns. 

Difficulties  consistent  with  the  work  of  a  special  mo- 
bilization were  experienced;  some  were  foreseen,  others 
resulted  from  the  peculiar  conditions  of  the  moment, 
namely  : 

The  fact  that  the  Class  of  1889  was  discharged  a  few 
days  previously. 

The  special  sanitary  regulations  of  the  kingdom,  pre- 
venting the  recall  to  arms  of  all  those  diseased. 

The  necessity  of  effecting  the  embarkation  of  the 
troops  without  interfering  with  the  normal  traffic  of  the 
ports,  especially  that  of  Naples,  selected  as  the  principal 
port  of  departure. 

The  necessity  of  obtaining  proper  transportation 
without  interfering  with  the  national  maritime  traffic. 

The  difficulty  of  equipping  all  the  expeditionary  force 
with  the  olive-drab  uniform,  when  said  uniform  had  not 
as  yet  been  adopted  by  all  the  arms. 

As  has  been  noted,  Turkey  evaded  answering  the  de- 
mands made  by  our  Government,  paid  no  attention  to  the 
remonstrances  made  by  us  against  the  sending  of  her 
troops  and  war  materiel  to  Tripoli,  and  finally  made  an 
evasive  reply  to  our  ultimatum. 

On  September  25,   191 1,  an  order  was  issued  desig- 


14  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

Dating  September  28,  191 1,  as  the  day  of  mobilization. 
The  Expeditionary  Force  consisted  of  the  Class  of  1890 
and  those  recalled  from  the  Class  of  1888. 

The  transports  were  turned  over  to  the  Navy  as  rap- 
idly as  possible,  and  materiel  was  freighted  with  all  ce- 
lerity to  the  point  of  embarkation.  Daily  requests  were 
made  by  officers  to  be  allowed  to  go  to  the  front,  and  many 
soldiers  of  the  Class  of  1888  made  similar  requests. 
Many  demands  were  made  by  ecclesiastics  and  different 
religious  orders  to  be  allowed  to  accompany  the  Hospital 
Corps.     A  convenient  number  of  all  were  assigned. 

As  soon  as  the  mobilization  was  commenced,  the  mili- 
tary authorities  ordered  that  all  interested  headquarters 
immediately  compile  and  forward  reports  relative  to  the 
movements  and  dispositions  of  the  troops,  so  that  this 
valuable  data  could  be  used  as  a  guide  for  such  future  or- 
ganization or  for  the  general  mobilization. 

Said  reports,  as  well  as  public  opinion  at  home  and 
abroad,  have  shown  that  the  dispositions  made  more  than 
fulfilled  expectations.  It  was  due  to  the  zeal  and  interest 
displayed  by  all  concerned  that  the  mobilization  was 
rapid  and  complete. 

But  the  new  conditions  arising  from  Turkish  concen- 
tration in  Libya  demanded  the  sending  of  a  force  much 
superior  to  the  one  contemplated,  and,  profiting  by  the 
experience  gained,  orders  were  issued  in  a  brief  time  for 
the  new  mobilization.  So  from  the  middle  of  October  to 
the  end  of  December  the  following  troops  were  mobilized  : 
2  commands  of  Divisions  (3d  and  4th)  ; 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  15 

7  brigades  of  Infantry  (5th  to  nth)  and  i  regi- 

ment (30th) ; 
6  battalions  of  Alpines  (Infantry)  ; 
I  regiment  of  Bersagliere  (Infantry)  ; 

8  squadrons  of  Cavalry; 

6  batteries  of  Field  Artillery  (mod.  1906)  ; 
II  batteries  of  Field  Artillery  (75-A,  3-in.); 

8  mountain  batteries; 

7  companies  of  Coast  Artillery,  for  service  with  5 

batteries  of  cannon  No.  149  (6-in.),  i  of  shell 
No.  149  (6-in.),  and  i  of  mortar  No.  210  (8-in.)  ; 

5  companies  of  sappers; 

4  mine  companies  ; 

I  company  of  telegraphers; 

1  section  of  aerostatics,  aeroplanes,  balloons,  etc.  ; 

2  radio-telegraph  stations  and  search-lights,  di- 

visional purposes  (3d  and  4th)  ; 
2  field  hospitals  of  50  beds  each; 
4  field  hospitals  of  100  beds  each; 
2  mountain  ambulances  (Red  Cross)  ; 
I  section  of  bake  ovens  (mod.  1897),  and  various 
supplies  for  garrison  purposes. 
With  this  mobilization  accomplished  and  in  addition 
to  the  first  expedition  we  now  have:     55,000  men,  8,300 
quadrupeds,   1,500  wagons,   84  field  guns,  42  mountain 
guns,  and  28  siege  guns. 

From  January  to  October,  191 2,  there  were  organized, 
as  exigencies  required  in  the  localities  of  Libya  and  the 
i^gean,  4  battahons  of  Alpines   (Infantry),   7  battalions 


1 6  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR, 

of  Ascari  (Colonial),  and  i  squadron  of  Meharisti  (native 
Colonial)  mounted  on  camels  ;  various  dirigibles  and  aero- 
planes were  sent  and  gave  proof  of  their  value,  which  was 
rapidly  developed. 

Simultaneously  with  the  sending  of  subsistence  and 
equipment  came  the  necessity  of  filling  the  vacancies 
caused  by  losses  through  battle  and  illness,  and  the  pro- 
viding of  substitutes  for  those  recalled  from  the  Class  of 
1888  and  discharged  in  April  and  May  (30,000  men)  and 
those  of  the  Class  of  1889  discharged  in  the  months  of 
July  and  August  (36,890  men). 

The  rapidity  of  the  movements  of  troops  and  materiel 
by  rail  was  truly  remarkable.  It  is  enough  to  state  that 
from  September,  191 1,  to  June  30,  191 2,  as  taken  from 
the  report  of  the  Administrator  of  Railways  for  the  year 
191 1 -1 2,  there  were  transported  for  the  war  in  Libya: 
2,940  officers,  184,290  men,  10,650  quadrupeds,  and  585 
wagons.  The  transportation  of  ammunition  and  aero- 
nautic material  was  ingeniously  effected.  The  principal 
part  of  this  work  occurred  in  the  months  of  October  and 
November,  191 1,  when  transportation  had  to  be  fur- 
nished simultaneously  for  those  discharged  at  Naples  and 
Palermo,  of  the  Class  of  1889,  and  those  called  to  arms, 
of  the  Class  of  1891.  This  meant  the  transportation  of 
about  250,000  men,  and  it  may  be  added  that  this  extra- 
ordinary movement  of  troops  by  rail  was  so  well  handled 
that  it  did  not  in  the  least  affect  the  public  service. 

The  excellent  results  obtained  in  this  mobilization, 
without  any  preparation  prior  to  the  declaration  of  war, 


TRIPOLI. — Krupp  Gun  ''Fort  Faro,"  Abandoned  in  Consequence  of  tlie 
Bombardment  bv  the  Fleet. 


r 


TRIPOLI. — Kru])!)  Cliin  Distnounfod  by  l'ire  from  the  Fleet. 


TRIPOLI.— Battery  afterlBombardment  by'the^Fleet. 


The  Harbor  at  Tobruk. 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  19 

has  demonstrated  that  even  the  urgent  disposition  of 
troops  can  be  accomplished  completely  and  with  prompt- 
ness in  the  face  of  all  difficulties,  because  of  well-thought- 
out  rules  and  instructions,  and  because  the  headquarters 
of  the  mobilization  were  well  prepared  to  meet  the  work  as 
it  occurred. 

The  result  has  proved  that,  although  it  is  desirable  to 
accomplish  work  of  this  nature  on  the  base  of  set  rules  and 
instructions,  the  good-will,  interest,  and  intelligent  zeal 
that  was  displayed  are  also  required,  and  that  with  this 
alone  seemingly  insurmountable  obstacles,  arising  from 
unexpected  orders,  can  be  overcome. 

The  hearty  cooperation  of  the  Navy,  the  railways, 
and  the  post  and  telegraph  offices  contributed  greatly  to 
the  success  of  this  mobilization. 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  21 

CHAPTER  II. 
Military  Operations. 

As  has  been  shown,  in  September,  1911,  the  Secretary 
of  War  prepared  for  miUtary  action  in  Libya  in  case 
the  situation  could  not  be  arranged  diplomatically  with 
Turkey. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  in  the  meantime  assembled 
the  fleet  and  made  preparations  to  transport  the  troops, 
ordered  the  forts  at  Taranto  and  Brindisi  and  the  coast 
defenses  of  Messina  to  place  themselves  in  readiness 
against  an  attack  from  the  sea,  and  the  other  coast  de- 
fenses to  consider  themselves  in  the  "position  of  alarm" 
in  the  time  of  peace.  He  also  installed  at  Vittoria  a  radio- 
telegraph station,  and  had  another  one  kept  in  readiness 
to  be  placed  where  it  might  later  be  required. 

Turkey  had  forces  in  Tripoli  amounting  to  about  5,000 
men,  and  in  Cyrenaica  about  2,000.  The  fortifications 
on  the  coast  were  antiquated  and  mediocre  in  their  arma- 
ment, hence  of  Httle  value,  and  the  tentative  union  of 
the  Arabian  redifs  (chiefs)  could  be  considered  as  a  failure. 

The  war,  owing  to  the  character  of  the  governmental 
pohcy,  had  to  be  declared  at  a  moment  when  the  cUmatic 
conditions  at  sea  were  not  propitious  for  the  landing  of 
troops  and  equipment;  but  any  delay  in  the  operations 
would  have  greatly  minimized  our  prestige  and  aug- 
mented the  difficulty  of  the  enterprise,  because  Turkey 


22  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

would  have  assuredly  taken  advantage  of  this  to  send 
new  troops,  arms,  ammunition,  and  provisions  to  Libya, 
and  to  further  arouse  the  Arabs  against  us. 

It  was  at  first  thought  that  a  few  acts  of  capture 
would  be  sufficient  to  cause  the  Turks  to  settle  the  matter 
diplomatically,  and  with  this  end  in  view  it  was  intended 
to  occupy  central  points  on  the  coast,  regarded  as  valua- 
ble politically  and  strategically  ;  namely,  Tripoli,  Tobruk, 
Derna,  Bengasi,  and  Homs. 

Owing  to  the  hostility  of  the  Arabs,  kindled  and  kept 
aflame  by  the  Turks,  it  was  found  necessary  to  reinforce 
the  corps  of  occupation  and  to  establish  firmly  the  nec- 
essary bases  from  which  to  proceed  for  action  into  the 
interior. 

It  became  evident  that  the  resistance  of  the  Arabs 
was  made  possible  by  contrabandists,  who,  widely  or- 
ganized, were  carrying  on  their  work  from  Tunisia  and 
Egypt  and  from  various  points  along  the  coast  not  oc- 
cupied, and  it  became  necessary  to  provide  troops  to 
prevent,  as  far  as  possible,  the  enemy  receiving  arms,  am- 
munition, etc.  This  caused  the  occupation  of  Zuara  and 
Misurata,  and  it  was  one  of  the  reasons  which  caused  the 
occupation  of  Dodecaneso  in  the  ^gean. 

Simultaneously  the  marines,  besides  protecting  the 
various  convoys,  cooperated  with  great  efficacy  in  the 
many  operations  of  the  landing  forces,  and  without  any 
assistance  and  with  admirable  bravery  made  landings  in 
the  Ionian  Sea,  in  the  Red  Sea,  on  the  coast  of  the  Yemen, 
on  the  coast  of  Syria,  and  in  the  Straits  of  Dardanelles. 


IR 


In  Camp  at  Bengasi. 


Garden  and  Vita  of  Bercas. 


TRIPOLI. — Infantry  Landing  from  Pontoons. 


I  LI. — Tombs. 


24 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  25 

The  theater  of  operations,  therefore,  limited  at  first  to  the 
coast  of  Libya  and  central  Mediterranean  coasts,  extended 
finally  along  the  Mediterranean  to  the  Red  Sea,  involving 
the  coasts  of  three  continents. 

The  troops  and  their  equipage  during  the  twelve 
months  of  war  gave  continued  proof  of  their  technical 
value  and  their  military  worth,  sustaining  with  great 
fortitude  the  trying  and  prolonged  worriments;  the  ex- 
cellence of  the  materiel  and  the  knowledge  and  skill  of 
the  commanding  officers,  both  ashore  and  afloat,  notwith- 
standing the  long  time  at  sea  and  the  numerous  bombard- 
ments, retained  to  the  end  of  the  war  their  integrity  and 
wonderful  efficiency. 

The  war  may  be  divided  thus: 

(a)  The  first  occupation  (October,  191 1); 

(fc)  The  establishment    of    bases     (until    March, 

1912); 
(c)  The  intensification  of  the  war  in  Libya  and  the 
^gean  (from  April,  19 12,  to  the  conclusion 
of  hostilities). 

The  First  Occupations. 

(October,  19 11) 

HostiHties  were  begun  with  brilHant  action  on  the  part 
of  our  forces  in  the  Ionian  Sea — that  is,  with  the  bombard- 
ment and  the  silencing  of  the  ports  of  Tripoli,  and  with 
the  occupation  of  the  city  by  1,700  sailors;  a  stroke  of 


2  6  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

valor  which  repulsed  and  frustrated  the  vigorous  attacks 
of  the  Turkish  troops  for  seven  days,  when  finally,  the 
nth  of  October,  the  first  troops  of  the  expeditionary 
force  landed,  and  the  proud  sailors  returned  to  their  ships. 
The  political  and  mihtary  situation  developed  into 
something  different  from  that  which  was  at  first  ex- 
pected. The  population  along  the  coast  and  the  towns 
near  by  became  hostile.  The  efficacy  of  the  Turkish 
propaganda,  nourished  by  continuous  assistance  of  arms, 
men,  and  money,  renewed  their  hatred  and  revived  hope 
in  the  success  of  the  war.  So  that  the  Turkish  Army  be- 
came, little  by  Httle,  transformed  into  what  may  be  called 
a  great  square  about  the  armed  and  turbulent  Arabs. 
They  profited  by  their  admirable  knowledge  of  the  intri- 
cate and  treacherous  locality,  and  proved  themselves  ad- 
versaries capable  of  prolonging  the  conflict.  Their  re- 
ligious fanaticism  and  savage  instincts  also  fomented  the 
rebelUon  in  Tripoli,  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  and 
adjacent  to  our  lines  of  defense. 

Combats  of  Henni-Sciara  Sciat  (October  23)  and  Henni-Bu 
M eliana  (October  26). 

The  outbreak  occurred  October  23,  191 1  (Henni- 
Sciara  Sciat),  on  which  day,  and  during  the  combat  of 
October  26th  (Henni-Bu  Meliana),  the  valor  and  firmness 
of  all  of  our  troops  underwent  a  severe  trial;  for  they 
repulsed    an    adversary  strong  in    numbers,  masterly  in 


In  Camp  at  Ain  Zara. 


HOMS. — Panorama. 


28 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  29 

deceit,  tenacious  in  close  quarters,  and  who  took  advan- 
tage of  all  the  cover  afforded  by  the  terrain. 

Our  losses  were  not  light,  but  justified  by  the  result, 
and  showed  that  the  morale  of  our  troops  was  excellent. 

In  the  meantime  other  points  along  the  coast  were 
occupied. 

Occupation  of  Tobruk  (October  4),  Derna  (October  18), 
Bengasi  (October  20),  and  Horns  (October  21). 

From  the  4th  of  October,  191 1,  our  flag  had  been 
flying  at  Tobruk,  whose  harbor  afi'orded  the  best  an- 
chorage in  all  Tripolitania  and  Cyrenaica.  It  was  used 
as  a  base  for  our  Navy,  which  was  operating  in  the  waters 
of  Cyrenaica.  Augosto  was  used  as  a  base  for  the  Tri- 
politan  coast. 

In  the  last  two  weeks  of  October  the  following  points 
were  occupied:  Derna  (i8th),  Bengasi  (20th),  and  Homs 
(21st). 

The  landing  from  the  battleship  Giuliana  (19th), 
which  was  the  prelude  to  the  taking  of  Bengasi,  ham- 
pered by  heavy  seas  and  resisted  by  the  enemy,  repre- 
sented one  of  the  most  brilliant  actions  of  all  the  war,  and 
was  the  beginning  of  the  cooperation  between  the  Army 
and  the  Navy  which  won  such  excellent  results  and  which 
continued  in  later  ventures.  On  that  date  also  occurred 
the  conquest  of  Berca,  defended  by  the  Arab-Turks, 
tenaciously  but  in  vain,  against  our  impetuous  troops. 


30  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

ESTABUSHMENT  OP   BaSES. 
ZONE  OP  TRIPOU. 

Combats  of  Hamidiè  (November  6,  191 1)  and  Renni-Messri 
(November  26,  1911). 

In  Tripoli  the  eastern  line  of  defense  had  to  be  with- 
drawn on  account  of  hygienic  demands  and  for  military 
purposes;  hygienic  demands,  because  of  the  numerous 
dead  bodies  of  the  enemy  remaining  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
line  after  the  battles  of  Henni-Sciara  Sciat  and  Bu  Meli- 
ana,  and  the  consequent  fear  of  contagion  to  the  troops  in 
the  trenches;  for  military  purposes,  because  it  was  nec- 
essary to  divide  the  troops  along  the  line  of  defense  in 
proportion  to  the  number  at  hand,  and  this  resulted  in  the 
unequal  development  of  that  line  and  gave  entry  to  the 
Arab-Turks. 

The  original  southern  Hne  had  to  be  maintained,  be- 
cause it  held  the  wells  of  Bu  Meliana,  which  supplied  the 
water  to  the  city.  The  troops  retired  from  the  heights  of 
Sidi  Messri,  Henni,  and  the  Hamidiè  Battery  to  the  line 
Sidi  Messri,  Hamura,  Feschlum,  and  the  Tombs  of  Cara- 
manli.  The  danger  from  contagion  being  over,  we  en- 
gaged the  enemy,  upon  the  arrival  of  fresh  troops  from 
Italy,  on  November  6th,  and  after  a  lively  and  tenacious 
fight  the  Hamidiè  Battery  was  re-occupied,  in  order  to 
diminish  their  desultory  attacks  and  to  prevent  them  from 
gaining  a  flank  position  to  our  line  of  defense.     On  the 


Artillory  Spotter. 


HOMS. — Heights  after  the  Occupation. 


fé'^- 


w»J»?;ì-c-s^.^^_  -VKfl**;-,  ^•i■i^ 


■^S^G^-^wa^^j». 


'^^^^ 


BENGASI.— Oasis  of   "Two  Palms.' 


23 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  33 

1 8th  a  great  number  of  Arab-Turks,  intrenched  near  the 
Tombs  of  Caramanli,  were  attacked  and  dispersed.  On 
the  morning  of  November  26th,  after  a  forced  suspension 
of  activity  caused  by  heavy  rains,  the  forts  of  Messri  were 
re-occupied;  and  at  4:00  p.  m.  Henni  and  the  region  im- 
mediately east  of  the  Hamidiè  Battery  were  also  taken, 
after  an  active  combat  around  huts,  walls,  and  defended 
heights,  which  were  finally  destroyed  by  dynamite. 

Combat  and  Occupation  of  Ain  Zara. 
(December  4,  191 1.) 

It  now  became  necessary  to  make  a  further  advance 
upon  Ain  Zara  to  rout  the  Arab-Turks,  because  by  occu- 
pying this  town  an  efficient  watch  could  be  kept  over  the 
caravans  traveling  through  the  desert,  the  southern  out- 
skirts of  the  oases,  and  the  communications  between 
Tripoli  and  Tagiura.  This  also  assured  us  the  possession 
of  the  city  and  enabled  us  to  keep  a  better  watch  over  the 
malcontents,  whose  actions  were  not  to  our  advantage. 

On  the  morning  of  December  4th,  after  a  rainy  night 
and  heavy  storm  at  daybreak,  our  troops  moved  on  to  the 
conquest  of  Ain  Zara.  The  attack  assumed  an  episodic 
character.  Later  in  the  day  it  became  necessary  to  bring 
on  the  line  several  mountain  batteries,  because  of  the 
terrain  (all  dunes  of  a  misleading  character),  and  because 
of  the  very  small  range  of  vision.  This  was,  moreover, 
necessitated  by  the  special  style  of  combat  of  the  enemy, 
who,  with  wonderful  abihty,  took  every  advantage  of  the 


34  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

cover  afforded  by  the  terrain,  passing  rapidly  from  one 
point  to  another  to  take  up  fire  upon  our  Une  from  long 
range,  then  closing  in  upon  our  lines  as  soon  as  our  bat- 
teries approached  the  mid  range. 

As  soon  as  the  various  groups  of  the  adversary  had 
been  dispersed,  our  columns  united  and  carried  the  last 
trench.  Towards  night  we  arrived  finally  at  the  edge  of 
the  high  plain  which  overlooks  Ain  Zara. 

The  enemy  was  retreating  in  disorder  towards  the 
south,  shelled  by  the  artillery,  leaving  in  our  hands  seven 
Krupp  guns  (87  mm.,  3 -in.);  small  arms;  ammunition 
for  both  artillery  and  rifles;  many  animals  and  much 
materiel. 

As  night  was  falling  and  the  ground  was  wet  and 
treacherous,  and  the  cavalry  fatigued  from  opposing  the 
Arabs  proceeding  from  Zanzur,  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy 
was  not  a  vigorous  one. 

With  Ain  Zara  occupied,  our  dominion  on  the  extreme 
eastern  limb  of  the  oasis  of  Tripoli  was  assured;  with  the 
occupation  of  the  oases  of  Sahel  and  Tagiura  (December 
10-13,  1911),  it  became  necessary  to  extend  our  field  of 
operations  in  the  desert  zone  towards  the  oases  which 
ranged  along  the  extreme  slope  of  the  higher  plane;  oases 
which  were  pointed  out  by  our  aviators  as  bases  from 
which  our  enemy  was  sending  men  and  provisions,  and 
which  were  being  used  as  meeting-places  for  the  tribes  to 
maintain  actively  the  fanatical  propaganda. 


ica«-4#'^'--^ 


.Viu'l    Uh'  uaUit'  ai    Ljt-iijia>l. 


Gymnastics. 


35 


Applied  r.vinn.istics— Italians  Dislodging  Bedouins  at  Bengasi. 


BENGASI. — Center  of  Resistance. 


Vallej'  of  Dema. 


3& 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  37 

Reconnaissance. 

The  cavalry  reconnoitered  towards  Bir  Tobras  and 
Bir  Edin;  and  on  December  17th  a  battalion  of  grenadiers 
pushed  as  far  south  as  12  kilometers  (8  miles)  below  Ain 
Zara;  on  the  19th  a  mixed  detachment  went  to  Bir  Tobras 
to  liberate  Arab  families  who  were  loyal  to  us,  but  held 
captive  by  the  enemy.  In  this  last  reconnaissance  officers 
and  men  had  been  subjected  to  long  and  continued  hard- 
ships and  all  the  privations  and  dangers  of  an  uncertain 
situation,  but  they  attacked  with  ardor,  valor,  and  firm- 
ness in  a  manner  to  impress  the  adversary,  who  were 
emboldened  by  their  superiority  in  number.  This  de- 
tachment hoped  to  obtain  an  easy  success  against  a  small 
number  of  troops  detached  from  their  base,  and  who 
were  for  the  first  time  fighting  on  a  desert  terrain  devoid 
of  sustenance.  The  detachment  succeeded  in  making  an 
undisturbed  retreat,  carrying  their  wounded  and  all  their 
equipment  ;  overcoming  the  difficulties  of  orientation  on  a 
dark  night,  they  returned  on  the  morning  of  the  20th 
to  Ain  Zara. 

Battle  and  Occupation  of  Gargaresc. 
(January  18-20,  19 12.) 

Our  occupation  had  now  to  be  extended  principally 
towards  the  east,  in  order  to  protect  the  marble  works  in 
the  garrisons  around  Gargaresc,  and  to  prevent  the  raids 
of  the  Arab-Turks  upon  the  population  loyal  to  us.  On 
January  18,  191 2,  the  enemy  was  attacked  and  defeated 


38  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

by  our  troops;  on  the  20th  the  town  was  garrisoned  and 
work  immediately  begun  to  fortify  it. 

Second  Combat  of  Ain  Zara. 
(January  28,  19 12.) 

On  January  28,  191 2,  after  a  respite,  a  violent  attack 
was  made  on  Ain  Zara;  and  around  Tripoli  a  series  of 
forays  were  made  by  the  cavalry  and  small  mixed  detach- 
ments. Numerous  trips  were  made  by  our  intrepid  avia- 
tors, dropping  bombs  on  the  enemy,  whose  attacks  on  our 
redoubts  and  detachments  were  in  every  case  vigorously 
repulsed. 

ZONE  OF  HOMS. 

In  the  meantime  combats  were  being  carried  on  with 
intensity  and  without  truce  along  other  points  of  the 
coast,  and  each  one  was  a  new  success  to  our  arms. 

Reconnaissance  of  Lebda. 

(December  i,  191 1.) 

At  Homs,  to  break  the  Turkish  telegraph  lines  and  to 
impress  the  Bedouins  encountered  in  the  vicinity  of 
Lebda  and  near  the  slopes  of  Mesellata,  we  attacked  the 
enemy  on  the  ist  of  December  and  defeated  them  about 
4  kilometers  {2}^  miles)  southeast  of  our  trenches. 
Thereafter  the  attacks  on  our  line  were  insignificant,  and 
the  time  at  our  disposal  was  utilized  in  fortifying  the  po- 
sition we  occupied.     This  work  was  not  simple,  owing  to 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  39 

the  natural  configuration  of  the  ground  around  Horns, 
hidden  from  view  along  the  Uttoral  by  the  oases  of  L,ebda 
and  the  numerous  Roman  ruins,  which  occupied  a  great 
deal  of  the  territory  in  those  parts,  dominated  towards 
the  west  and  southwest  especially  by  the  hills  of  Mergheb 
— a  point  excellently  defended,  and  facing  Horns  with  a 
clear  range  of  vision. 

Combat  and  Occupation  of  Mergheb. 
(February  27,  19 12.) 

This  strong  position  at  Mergheb  had  been  noted  ;  and 
occasionally  from  its  heights  cannon  had  been  fired  upon 
the  city.  It  was  therefore  found  necessary  to  occupy 
these  heights.  This  was  carried  out  decisively  on  the 
27th  of  February.  To  diminish  the  forces  of  the  de- 
fenders, a  well-simulated  move  was  made  towards  Sliten 
to  entice  the  enemy  in  that  direction  ;  meanwhile  three  of 
our  columns  approached  Mergheb  silently,  and  the  Arab- 
Turks  were  accordingly  surprised.  The  enemy  than  made 
a  violent  counter-attack;  but  after  a  mixed  and  close 
combat  and  an  impetuous  flank  attack  by  our  columns, 
the  enemy  was  routed  by  a  bayonet  charge. 

Night  Combat  of  Mergheb. 

(March  5-6,  1912.) 

In  spite  of  their  losses,  the  enemy  did  not  give  up  ;  and 
on  the  night  of  March  5-6th  they  attempted  to  regain 
their  former  position  by  a  furious  attack,  hoping  to  find 


40  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

our  vigilance  relaxed.  Officers  and  men  had,  however, 
intelligently  fortified  their  position  and  were  eagerly  on 
the  watch,  so  that  the  Arab-Turks  found  the  defenders 
calm  and  assured  of  their  position,  and  suffered  consequent 
losses.  Meanwhile,  to  the  east  of  Homs,  our  troops  frus- 
trated a  tentative  attack  made  with  the  object  in  view  of 
diverting  the  attention  of  the  defenders  of  Mergheb. 

ZONE  OF  BENGASI. 

In  the  days  subsequent  to  our  occupation,  the  nucleus 
of  the  Arab-Turks  had  by  preference  rallied  in  the  oasis 
near  the  city  of  Bengasi,  aiming  to  have  better  facilities 
to  secure  their  provisions  and  to  keep  in  touch  with  the 
inhabitants. 

Combat  of  Koefia. 
(November  28,  191 1.) 

After  having  advised  the  outposts  (established  at 
Daut-Luba  and  Ras  el  Ferg),  a  column  consisting  of  the 
three  arms  pushed  towards  Sidi  Calif  a  the  28th  of  No- 
vember, and  at  Koefia  our  troops,  after  ably  overcoming 
the  difficulty  of  the  terrain,  and  giving  proof  of  their 
vigor  and  ardor,  surprised  and  dispersed  a  large  force  of 
Bedouins,  who  left  on  the  field  21  dead,  among  them 
chiefs  of  the  Avaghir  tribe,  who  had  entered  the  combat 
on  horseback. 

Towards  the  end  of  November  and  the  beginning  of 
December  the  work  of  systematizing  the  defenses  of  the 
city  proceeded  uninterruptedly,  and  meanwhile  the  Arab- 


Instructions  on  Board  Ship. 


41 


Castle  of  Orfella. 


I 


à 


'i    > 


> 


\  ' 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  43 

Turkish  force  was  rapidly  growing,  augmented  by  the 
arrival  of  the  regular  troops  from  the  Egyptian  frontier, 
as  well  as  by  the  assistance  in  this  respect  of  the  popula- 
tion of  the  hinterland.  The  tactics  preferred  by  the 
enemy  were  to  simulate  night  attacks,  with  the  object  in 
view  of  disturbing  the  repose  of  our  troops  and  provoking 
useless  expenditure  of  ammunition,  and  hoping  to  sur- 
prise the  advance  works  of  the  defense  and  the  line  of 
security  of  Bengasi. 

These  sporadic  attacks  were  always  promptly  and  en- 
ergetically repulsed  with  the  assistance  of  our  Navy, 
who  cooperated  in  the  fire-action  and  with  their  search- 
lights illuminated  the  terrain  near  our  lines  and  con- 
tiguous to  the  sea.  The  Navy,  besides  bombarding 
Koefia,  bombarded  the  oases  of  Suani  Osman,  Tolmetta, 
Bersis,  and  Tocra,  to  punish  the  inhabitants,  who  were 
giving  aid  to  the  enemy  around  Bengasi  by  furnishing 
men  from  their  tribes. 

Defense  of  Bengasi. 
(December  25,  1911.) 

After  a  brief  respite,  from  the  i6th  to  the  21st  of  De- 
cember, the  activity  of  the  enemy  manifested  itself  on  the 
2 2d  by  an  attack  upon  a  camp  redoubt  and  a  defended 
post.  This  was  a  prelude  to  the  general  attack  upon  the 
city  on  December  25th.  This  action  involved  only  the 
artillery,   as  the  Arab-Turks  advanced  cautiously  and 


44  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

kept  a  great  distance  from  the  lines.  The  other  arms, 
ready  and  on  the  watch,  consequently  participated  neither 
in  the  action  nor  in  the  defense  of  the  trenches  nor  in  the 
counter-attacks. 

The  artillery  opened  up  an  efficacious  and  continuous 
fire  at  3,800  to  4,000  meters  (4,000  to  4,300  yards),  using 
29  pieces,  each  one  firing  on  an  average  of  39  shots. 
There  were  no  appreciable  losses;  and  when  it  is  taken 
into  consideration  that  the  firing  kept  up  all  day,  the  ex- 
penditure of  that  amount  of  ammunition  was  justified. 
The  batteries  gave  proof  of  their  perfect  fire-discipline, 
excellent  technical  and  professional  preparation,  efficacy, 
and  coordination  of  action. 

The  enemy  took  advantage  of  nightfall  and  retreated, 
leaving  on  the  field  200  dead,  several  hundred  wounded, 
two  dismantled  guns,  and  many  horses. 

Battle  of  Suani  el  Rani  or  "Due  Palme"  {"Two  Palms"), 
(March  12,  1912.) 

Serious  losses  occurred  two  and  one-half  months  after- 
wards in  the  battle  of  Suani  el  Rani,  better  known  as 
"Two  Palms." 

From  December  to  March  the  work  of  the  enemy  was 
limited  to  small  skirmishes  around  our  redoubts  and  out- 
posts or  with  our  reconnoitering  parties;  on  the  12th  of 
March  they  showed  considerable  force  and  started  a  gen- 
eral attack  upon  the  city,  but  hesitated,  owing  to  our  im- 


-^    *lwt 


^■W'   "^..IM.^- 


Landing  at  Kalitheas. 


45 


A  Halt  during  the  Advance  on  Rhodes. 


Panorama  of  Psitos. 


Turkish  Prisoners. 


46 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  47 

mediate  and  energetic  counter-attack.  They  attempted 
to  withstand  the  attack,  but  in  vain  ;  our  valorous  troops 
surrounded  them  with  a  ring  of  fire  and  steel  and  anni- 
hilated them.  Nearly  one  thousand  were  left  dead  on 
the  field,  while  many  more  died  in  consequence  of  their 
wounds. 

The  result  obtained  was  the  reward  of  constant  co- 
operation of  the  various  arms  and  of  the  intelligence, 
discipline,  and  incomparable  dash  of  our  troops.  The 
behavior  of  our  infantry  was  splendid;  their  advance 
under  the  heavy  fire  of  the  adversary  is  deserving  of  every 
praise.  Calm  and  in  good  order,  with  excellent  examples 
set  by  their  officers,  they  launched  themselves  upon  the 
enemy,  engaging  them  in  a  hand-to-hand  conflict,  from 
which  they  emerged  victorious. 

This  day  set  the  seal  of  approval  on  the  excellence 
of  the  organization  of  the  artillery,  who  did  their  work 
patiently,  and  gained  their  fire  of  position  with  a  clearness 
of  scope.  The  functions  and  range  of  the  field  and 
mountain  batteries  were  excellent;  the  pieces  were  light 
and  ably  handled,  and  the  ability  to  make  hits  and  the 
discipline  were  perfect. 

The  cavalry  assaulted  in  an  orderly  and  prompt 
manner.  They  carried  out  the  orders  to  protect  the 
right  wing  from  attack,  and  later  assisted  in  developing 
this  wing  in  a  most  commendable  manner. 

Even  the  intrenchments  and  field  works  of  Bengasi 
revealed  their  efficacy  by  the  fact  that  a  decisive  and 
ofifensive  action  took  place  under  their  immediate  pro- 


48  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

tection,  and  (the  artillery  of  a  whole  sector  was  brought 
into  action)  demonstrated  the  excellent  position  of  these 
works  and  that  they  dominated  the  surrounding  terrain. 
The  battle  of  "Two  Palms"  greatly  dampened  the 
ardor  of  the  enemy,  and  they  no  longer  attempted  to  at- 
tack in  force.  Our  aviators  dropped  bombs  on  them,  and 
our  Navy  bombarded  various  points  along  the  coast. 
So  they  contented  themselves  with  small  attacks  against 
our  redoubts  and  workmen,  but  were  always  easily  re- 
pulsed. At  times  they  fired  upon  our  troops  while  at 
drill.  The  three  arms  were  drilled  daily  to  keep  them  in 
trim  and  to  intimidate  the  enemy. 

ZONE  OF  DERNA. 

The  garrison  of  Derna  had  to  show  its  mettle,  owing 
to  the  topography  of  the  terrain  in  that  vicinity.  The 
city  was  situated  on  the  face  of  a  rocky  cliff;  there  was 
no  accessible  way  to  reach  the  higher  plain,  nor  could  one 
be  built,  as  the  rock  was  composed  of  limestone  and 
crumbled.  The  higher  plane  had  also  a  wide  gap,  caused 
by  rain  and  sun,  which  did  not  present  any  foothold, 
being  cut  up  by  sharp  cliffs  and  thick,  impassable  vegeta- 
tion. This  precipice  was  honeycombed  with  caverns  and 
cells,  greatly  assisting  the  inhabitants  in  their  innate 
spirit  of  brigandage  and  rapine. 

Therefore  a  great  deal  of  difficulty  was  experienced 
with  this  terrain  in  securing  a  line  of  defense,  either  to- 
wards the  east  or  towards  the  west,  to  protect  the  potable 
water. 


TurkLsli  Prisoners. 


ininDES. -Towor  of  tho  Aunr-h 


49 


1{I1(  )\)KS     -I)q);irture  of  Iroo]) 


:  .^v'^ 


^•^#'« 


Ruins  at  Lebda. 


MISURATA.— Cape  Zarrug. 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  51 

The  encounters  fought  here  until  September,  191 1, 
were  not  of  a  decisive  character,  because  it  would  have 
been  perilous  and  imprudent  to  venture  into  this  unknown 
and  impervious  zone  to  follow  the  enemy  into  possible 
ambush.  But  they  offered  themselves  continually  to 
our  fire — both  the  fire  of  the  troops  who  protected  the 
workmen  and  in  general  attacks  made  with  the  hope  of 
recapturing  the  city. 


Defense  of  the  Redoubts  of  Lombardia  and  Calabria. 
(February  11-12,  19 12.) 

Defeat  after  defeat  occurred  to  the  Arab-Turks,  a 
memorable  one  being  the  night  attack  February  ii-i2th, 
commanded  by  En  ver  Bey. 

The  battle  of  Sidi  Abdallah  (March  3,  191 1)  also 
proved  disastrous  for  the  enemy.  They  displayed  their 
forces  in  the  manner  most  favorable  to  them,  taking  ad- 
vantage of  the  cover  afforded  by  the  difficult  and  treach- 
erous ground.  The  day  was  one  of  laborious  combat; 
but  the  great  forces  of  the  adversary,  with  their  knowl- 
edge of  the  terrain  and  their  fanatical  enthusiasm,  were 
met  by  the  sturdy  opposition  of  our  troops,  who,  at  the 
proper  time,  encountered  the  foe  with  firmness  and 
charged  them  with  impetuosity. 


52  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

Intensification  of  the  War  in  Libya  and  the  ^gean. 

(From  April  12th  to  the  Declaration  of  Peace.) 

zone  of  zuara. 

To  put  a  stop  to  the  contraband  of  war  in  Tunis,  it 
was  decided,  in  the  latter  part  of  December,  1911,  to 
make  a  landing  at  Zuara;  but  heavy  seas,  due  to  high 
winds,  which  continued  for  three  weeks,  caused  the  aban- 
donment of  the  enterprise.  The  Navy,  however,  had  a 
chance  to  prove  its  great  value,  and  the  troops  to  dem- 
onstrate their  patience  during  their  long  confinement 
aboard  ship,  from  the  2 2d  of  December  to  the  14th  of 
January,  on  which  latter  date  the  enterprise  was  definitely 
given  up. 

Landing  at  Macahez. 
(April  10-14,  1912.) 

Persisting,  however,  in  the  necessity  of  preventing 
this  smuggling,  another  attempt  was  made  to  land  at 
Zuara  in  April,  19 11;  but,  owing  to  various  nautical  and 
military  features,  it  was  decided  to  land  at  Macabez  in- 
stead. This  landing  was  accomplished  by  all  the  arms 
in  four  days,  after  experiencing  great  hydrographic  dif- 
ficulties. Again  the  Navy  showed  their  abihty  to  co- 
operate with  the  troops. 


Landing  at  Misurata. 


53 


Skinni,sli  Advance  on  Misuiata. 


Artillery  Advance  on  Misurata. 


Trenches — Oasis  of  Misurata. 


54 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  55 

The  beach,  Fort  Bu  Chemesc,  and  the  caravans  were 
taken  possession  of,  all  of  which  were  to  serve  to  carry 
the  expeditions  into  the  interior  towards  the  new  lines  of 
communication,  which  the  Arab-Turks  would  not  have 
failed  to  single  out. 

Our  troops  were  well  tried  in  the  long  and  obscure 
work,  landing  upon  a  beach  open  and  deserted  (probably 
the  only  case  of  its  kind  where  such  maritime  conditions 
were  overcome),  desiring  to  face  an  enemy  who  could 
display  a  force  and  ardor  worthy  of  the  effort  made  to 
reach  them. 

The  enemy  appeared  on  the  23d  of  April  at  Bu 
Chemesc,  and  our  gallant  soldiers  had  their  desires  ful- 
filled. With  great  violence  and  vigor,  the  enemy  at- 
tacked successively  from  the  east,  southeast,  and  west. 

Mowed  down  by  the  artillery  from  our  works  and  from 
our  counter-attacks,  after  a  spirited  combat  they  were 
compelled  to  retreat,  leaving  a  great  number  of  dead 
and  wounded. 

Operations  for  the  Occupation  of  Sidi  Said. 

(January  26,  27,  28,  1912.) 

The  frequent  offensive  reconnaissances  sent  out  by 
our  troops  had  permission  to  capture  the  caravans  and  to 
disperse  the  Arab-Turk  convoys,  but  it  was  not  altogeth- 
er easy  nor  convenient  to  halt  and  sustain  themselves, 
owing  to  the  absolute  hostility  of  the  inhabitants  and 
the  difficulty  of  maintaining  communications  across  the 


56  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

uninterrupted  series  of  streams  (called  sebche)  that  run 
through  the  middle  of  the  zone  of  Bu  Chemesc. 

The  enemy  (consisting  of  several  thousand  men,  many- 
horses,  and  some  cannon)  attempted  to  oppose  every 
tentative  move  we  made  towards  the  caravans.  But, 
uncertain  of  the  direction  of  our  movements  and  be- 
cause of  our  persistent  activity  around  Bu  Chemesc,  they 
formed  a  cordon  with  a  front  of  about  30  kilometers  (19 
miles),  out  of  range  of  our  artillery,  with  their  right  on 
the  stronghold  Sidi  Said  and  their  left  eastward  of  the 
Tunisian  border.  With  this  ample  front,  and  not  having 
been  sufficiently  harassed  by  our  troops,  who  had  only 
gone  15  kilometers  (9  miles)  inland,  they  had  little  by 
little  strongly  fortified  themselves. 

After  the  decision  to  attack,  to  avoid  proceeding 
through  the  inhospitable  region  next  to  the  Tunisian 
border,  it  was  decided  to  march  in  two  columns  from 
Macabez  and  Bu  Chemesc,  respectively,  to  mass  against 
the  position  of  Sidi  Said,  the  conquest  of  which  would 
in  all  probability  determine  the  fall  of  the  Arab-Turk 
defense.  And  so  it  happened;  the  methodical  plan  of 
attack  was  crowned  with  success  on  the  victorious  days 
of  June  26th,  27th  and  28th,  which  gave  us  possession  of 
Sidi  Said,  a  very  important  position  on  the  road  of  Zelten 
and  Zuara,  and  gave  us  uncontested  domain  of  40  kilo- 
meters (26  miles)  of  coast,  from  the  Tunis  border  to  Sidi 
Said  and  to  the  line  of  streams. 

The  losses  of  the  Arab-Turks  were  more  than  700 
dead,  left  on  the  field,  and  a  large  number  of  wounded; 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  57 

arms,   ammunition,    animals,    and   various   materiel   fell 
into  our  hands. 

Our  troops  behaved  admirably,  as  did  the  commanders 
who  led  them  on  to  victory  ;  and  with  the  faith  that  was 
placed  in  them,  everything  seemed  possible  in  the  face  of 
the  difficult  terrain,  the  enemy,  the  climate,  and  re- 
sources. The  spontaneous  and  intelligent  accord  be- 
tween the  various  commanders,  arms,  and  the  Army  and 
Navy  corresponded  excellently  to  the  particular  require- 
ments during  the  three  days  of  operation,  constituting  in 
their  completeness  a  prepared  ofiFensive  combat. 

Battle  of  Sidi  Ali. 

(July  14,  1912.) 

A  few  days  later  the  opportunity  presented  itself  to 
extend  our  territorial  occupation  as  far  as  Sidi  AH,  a  high 
position  6  kilometers  (4  miles)  to  the  eastward  of  Sidi 
Said,  which  would  assure  our  halt  during  our  stay  in  this 
latter  locality,  an  advanced  post,  and  an  excellent  point 
of  vedette  on  the  Zuara  road  ;  and  it  would  impede  in  the 
meantime  the  Arab-Turks  from  assembling  at  and  using 
this  point  from  which  to  molest  our  occupation  of  Sidi 
Said.  This  point  was  carried  on  July  14th,  after  a  bril- 
liant reconnaissance  by  one  of  our  flying  columns,  which 
disposed  of  the  fear  of  any  serious  threat  on  the  part  of  a 
nucleus  of  the  enemy  assembled  to  the  southward  of  Bu 
Chemesc.  The  combat  was  violent  and  at  close  quarters, 
and  the  enemy  numerous,  reinforced  from  the  Sahara  the 


58  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

day  after  Sidi  Said.  Terrific  heat  tended  to  diminish  our 
forces;  but  the  troops  maintained,  as  always,  an  elevated 
spirit,  and  their  conduct  was  admirable. 

The  enemy  was  beaten  and  demoralized.  "It  is  des- 
tiny," so  terminated  a  canard  in  a  Tunisian  newspaper. 
"Ah!  destiny,  the  prophet  of  reason,  is  with  the  Italians, 
and  our  troops  fall  like  flies  before  the  enemy's  fire." 
There  was  no  further  need  to  defend  Zuara,  a  city  exposed 
to  the  fire  of  our  Navy,  as  was  also  the  surrounding  ter- 
rain. Its  peculiar  conformation  and  works  erected  by 
the  enemy  were  adapted  to  a  tenacious  resistance. 

Occupation  of  Zuara. 
(August  6,  191 2.) 

Our  troops  entered  with  hardly  any  casualty,  after 
having  dispersed  small  squads  of  the  enemy's  rear  guard. 

Zuara  was  the  objective  towards  which  operations 
were  to  point  after  the  abandonment,  because  of  logical 
difficulties,  of  any  further  penetration  of  the  Tunisian 
border.  This  was,  besides  representing  the  center  of 
habitation,  the  most  important  of  all  the  vast  region  to 
the  eastward  of  the  border.  Regdaline  was  the  principal 
gathering-place  of  the  caravans  which  proceeded  from 
the  border  to  the  eastward.  To  the  south  of  Regdaline 
the  country  was  a  desert  waste,  not  containing  sufficient 
water  to  allow  the  passage  of  numerous  caravans.  There- 
fore, with  the  zone  of  Zuara-Regdaline  occupied,  the  train 
of  caravans  that  had  used  the  trail  close  to  the  sea  were 


DERXA.^Bu  Msafer. 


59 


DERNA.— Halg  Gianiba. 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  6i 

effectively  intercepted  and  eliminated,  and  the  great 
contraband  trade  was  limited  to  the  mountain  roads, 
which  were  so  distant  and  difficult  that  it  was  not  found 
worth  while  to  consider  them.  It  was  impossible  to  at- 
tend simultaneously  to  the  two  objectives,  Zuara  and 
Regdaline,  owing  to  the  insufficiency  of  forces.  Zuara, 
if  found  undefended,  could  be  reached  on  the  same  day, 
and  an  offensive  operation  made  against  Regdaline  and 
Menscia  on  the  following  day,  to  cut  off  a  caravan  com- 
ing from  the  west.  It  was  found  convenient  to  abstain, 
owing  to  the  extreme  high  temperature  and  the  hardships 
the  troops  were  subjected  to,  deprived  of  the  bare  neces- 
sities, which  were  still  on  board,  and  because  of  the  youth 
of  the  men  of  this  class. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  day  after  the  occupation  it 
was  discovered,  without  doubt,  that  a  general  uprising 
amongst  the  inhabitants  was  contemplated,  and  they 
would  be  joined  by  the  armed  "Mehalle"  in  case  our 
vigilance  between  Zuara  and  Regdaline  was  at  all  relaxed. 

Combat  and  Occupation  of  Regdaline. 
(August  15,  1912.) 

With  the  troops  reorganized  and  fully  equipped,  the 
advance  towards  RegdaHne  was  made  August  15th. 

The  enemy,  remembering  our  impetuosity  and  firm 
intent  to  win,  experienced  at  Sidi  Said  and  Sidi  Ali,  com- 
ported themselves  accordingly  when  we  confronted  them 
en  masse;  the  more  audacious  ones,  however,  rallied  on 


62  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

our  extreme  left  and  opposed  us  in  close  quarters;  but 
our  troops,  with  their  usual  valor,  did  not  delay  in 
flanking  and  dispersing  them. 

Thereafter  and  until  the  declaration  of  peace  our  only 
engagements  were  small  skirmishes  or  artillery  fire  upon 
caravans  in  the  distance. 

OPERATIONS  IN  THE  ^GEAN. 

The  better  to  prevent  the  smuggling  of  arms  from 
Turkey  to  Libya,  to  aggravate  the  moral  situation  of  the 
enemy  at  home  and  abroad,  and  to  have  pledges  in  our 
favor  in  case  of  a  peace  treaty,  it  was  decided  to  occupy 
some  of  the  islands  in  the  lower  ^gean. 

The  island  of  Stampalia,  on  account  of  its  topo- 
graphical conformation  and  its  central  position  regarding 
the  islands  in  the  lower  ^gean,  was  selected  as  a  base  for 
the  naval  forces  detailed  to  operate  in  those  waters,  and 
was  occupied  April  28th.  An  expeditionary  force  that 
was  being  organized  at  Tobruk  sailed  on  the  night  of 
May  3d-4th,  escorted  by  the  ships  of  the  second  squadron, 
and  proceeded  to  the  isle  of  Rhodes. 

Expedition  to  Rhodes. 

This  island,  bound  to  Italy  from  time  immemorial,  is 
certainly  the  most  important  of  the  Sporades  group,  and 
also  economical  as  a  station  for  transit  from  the  eastern 
to  the  western  cities  of  the  Mediterranean,  in  spite  of  its 
squalid  decadence  since  the  sixteenth  century. 


Italian  Colonial  Troops. 


i:     '■■-■ 


Squad  of  Meharisti. 


64 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  65 

Landing  at  Kalitheas  and  the  Battle  oj  Asguru. 
(May  4,  191 2.) 

The  expeditionary  force  rapidly  landed  at  Kalitheas 
before  daylight  on  the  4th,  met  the  enemy  at  Asguru,  and 
dispersed  them;  the  following  day  Rhodes  was  entered. 

We  decided  not  to  give  the  Turkish  garrison  a  chance 
to  organize  armed  bands  or  receive  reinforcements;  but 
before  a  decisive  engagement  was  fought  it  was  necessary 
to  construct  a  solid  base  which  would  guarantee  the 
safety  of  the  operating  troops.  Political  and  military 
preparations  were  also  necessary  for  various  reasons,  and 
could  not  be  hurried,  requiring  great  foresight  in  order  to 
arrive  at  the  desired  end.  This  work  was  completed  on 
the  14th,  nine  days  after  the  entrance  of  our  troops 
into  Rhodes;  thereafter  they  were  able  to  march  into 
the  interior. 

Battle  oj  Psitos. 

(May  16-17,  1912.) 

The  enemy,  after  being  disbanded  during  the  retreat 
on  the  4th,  gradually  ralhed  at  Psitos;  which  was  an  ad- 
vantage for  us,  for  we  could  encounter  the  whole  force, 
and  not  have  prolonged  warfare  with  fractions  of  their 
troops.  The  intent  was  perfectly  carried  out,  after  dif- 
ficult and  fatiguing  maneuvers;  the  opportune  disposi- 
tions of  the  command,  the  admirable  accord  between  the 


66  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

Army  and  Navy,  and  the  magnificent  conduct  of  our 
troops  won  for  us  this  reward. 

For  the  first  time  in  history,  rapidly  and  without  the 
sUghtest  inconvenience,  two  landings  of  troops  and  ma- 
teriel were  contemporaneously  made  at  night,  without 
the  assistance  of  moon  or  lights,  on  a  shore  open  and 
hostile. 

The  merit  of  the  excellent  results  obtained  belongs  to 
the  Navy,  for  the  skill  and  ardor  demonstrated,  and  to 
the  troops,  who  behaved  with  dash  and  perfect  discipUne. 
Our  troops  marched  fourteen  hours  at  night,  across 
country  unknown,  mountainous,  broken  by  deep  ravines, 
rough  and  steep  paths,  yet  they  were  able  to  arrive  on  the 
field  of  action  and  enter  into  combat  against  fresh  troops. 

The  Turks  at  Psitos  found  themselves  surrounded 
by  a  ring  of  steel,  and  endeavored  in  vain  to  escape;  at 
nightfall  they  took  refuge  in  the  valley  of  Maritza,  fol- 
lowed and  held  there  by  our  troops,  and  on  the  following 
day  they  were  made  prisoners.  Immediately  afterwards 
our  troops,  in  spite  of  the  day's  battle  following  the 
fatiguing  march  and  notwithstanding  the  unsatisfying 
repose  of  the  previous  night,  spent  on  the  rocks,  took  up 
the  return  march  to  Rhodes,  covering  in  forty-eight 
hours  (twenty  hours'  marching  time)  a  distance  of  75 
kilometers  (50  miles)  or  more,  under  conditions  anything 
but  normal  and  on  haversack  rations.  We  have  there- 
fore a  proof  that  our  troops  are  inexhaustible,  precious 
and  enviable  treasures  of  miUtary  virtue. 

On  the  12th  of  May  the  fleet  landed  sailors  on  the 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  67 

islands  of  Scarpanto,  Casos,  Episcopi,  Nisyros,  Calymnus, 
Leros,  and  Patmos,  and  captured  the  small  Turkish  gar- 
risons and  raised  the  national  flag.  Successively  they 
occupied  the  islands  of  Cos,  Symi,  and  Calchi,  so  that 
during  the  month  of  May  the  southern  Sporades  fell  into 
our  hands. 

ZONE  OF  HOMS. 

Battle  and  Occupation  of  Lebda. 

(May  2,  1912.) 

The  garrison  at  Mergheb  was  reinforced,  and  then  it 
was  found  necessary  to  push  towards  Lebda,  in  order 
that  our  troops  might  have  freedom  of  movement  to  the 
eastward. 

Exact  account  had  been  kept  of  the  enemy  and  their 
disposition,  so  that  the  attack  was  planned  for  the  2d 
of  May.  While  the  garrison  at  Mergheb  engaged  the 
enemy  in  their  vicinity,  two  of  our  columns  advanced 
silently  and  in  accord  upon  Lebda,  to  surprise  the  adver- 
sary. They,  however,  managed  to  extricate  themselves 
from  our  grasp  in  a  precipitate  flight,  but  they  suffered 
heavy  losses,  and  on  that  victorious  day  left  in  our  hands 
the  ruins  of  an  antique  city  of  the  Roman  Empire. 

Battle  of  the  Monticelli  di  Lebda. 

(June  12,  1912.) 
The  activity  of  the  enemy  was  subdued   after  the 


68  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

sanguinary  engagement  at  the  Monticelli,  June  12,  191 2. 

The  garrison  at  Horns  having  been  diminished  by  the 
departure  of  several  detachments,  needed  at  other  posts, 
the  hope  arose  among  the  Arab-Turks  that  they  could 
attack  our  line  of  Lebda  (the  Monticelli)  and  Homs  to 
advantage.  Their  illusion,  however,  was  replaced  by  a 
tragic  realization  when,  having  failed  to  surprise  us,  the 
Arab-Turks  beat  a  hasty  retreat:  some  towards  the 
south,  raked  by  a  rapid  and  accurate  fire  from  our  bat- 
teries; some  towards  the  deep  ravines  of  Lebda,  where 
our  men,  indefatigable  and  exalted  by  victory,  followed 
them  tenaciously,  so  that  not  one  of  the  enemy  thus  cut 
off  managed  to  escape.  A  detachment  of  Arab-Turks 
on  Mount  Rosse  did  not  have  time  to  extricate  itself 
and  was  "nailed  to  the  spot." 

This  made  the  fourth  victorious  combat  for  the  troops 
of  Homs,  undoubtedly  unprecedented  for  positive  and 
moral  results,  and  which  greatly  contributed  to  the  pride 
of  the  Italian  soldier;  as  our  forces  in  these  cases  were 
much  smaller  than  those  of  our  adversary,  whereas  in 
other  cases  our  forces  were  numerically  stronger. 

The  greater  losses  were  inflicted  upon  the  enemy  by 
rifle  and  artillery  fire,  but  the  bayonet  also  had  its  place 
of  honor;  glistening  along  the  line,  furiously  seeking  the 
enemy,  closely  pursuing,  and  finally  engaging  him  in 
mortal  combat. 

After  this  complete  and  bloody  defeat,  the  activity 
of  the  enemy  ceased  around  Homs.  Entanglements  of 
wire  and  other  material  were  made  to  keep  off  the  ma- 


69 


BKXCASI.— Sentries  of  a  Battery 


Hospital  Ship. 


Customs  ^^"harf  at  Tripoli. 


70 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  71 

rauding  Bedouins.     A  few  shots,   however,   always  put 
them  to  rout. 

ZONE  OF  MISURATA. 

In  order  to  extend  our  occupations  towards  the  west 
on  the  TripoUtan  coast,  on  the  i6th  of  June,  nearly  two 
months  after  the  capture  of  Macabez,  a  surprise  landing 
was  made  on  the  coast  of  Misurata.  The  operations 
were  carried  on  with  such  excellent  order  and  celerity 
that  we  only  met  with  a  futile  resistance.  A  battalion 
of  sailors  and  a  company  of  infantry  landed  and  dis- 
persed the  small  number  of  the  enemy  assembled  on  the 
beach,  and  with  admirable  impetuosity  immediately  oc- 
cupied the  hill  and  pushed  on  to  Ras  Zorug.  The  balance 
of  the  expedition  was  landed  and  undisturbed,  and  on  the 
following  day  the  oasis  of  Kasr-Hamed  was  occupied. 

It  might  have  been  possible  to  send  a  detachment  to 
Misurata  immediately,  taking  advantage  of  the  disor- 
ganized enemy  and  the  panic  of  the  population  ;  but  such 
a  resolution  might  have  been  repented,  owing  to  the 
limited  forces  at  hand  ;  it  being  necessary  to  leave  on  the 
coast  a  considerable  number  of  troops  to  protect  the 
landing  of  materiel  and  to  establish  and  garrison  a  base. 

Battle  and  Occupation  of  Misurata. 

(July  8,  19 1 2.) 

But  on  the  7th  of  July,  after  twenty  days'  liv^ely  work, 
the  defense  of  the  base  was  systematized,  and  on  the  8th 


72  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

we  occupied  successively  the  oasis  of  Misurata  and 
Zarrug,  and  then  the  city  of  Misurata.  The  enemy,  after 
the  capture  of  Zarrug,  made  weak  resistance  here  and 
there,  having  been  at  Zarrug  subjected  to  artillery  fire  and 
the  violent  assaults  of  our  troops,  and  put  to  rout. 

Our  men,  now  veterans  of  nearly  all  the  other  combats, 
behaved  with  admirable  ardor  and  dash,  physical  re- 
sistance, and  excellent  discipline.  They  took  advantage 
of  all  the  cover  of  the  terrain,  and  therefore  their  losses 
were  relatively  slight. 

As  soon  as  Misurata  was  occupied,  a  military  and  po- 
litical regime  was  immediately  begun  against  the  enemy, 
who  had  fled  to  the  south  and  west  of  the  oasis  of  Mis- 
urata. At  times  they  showed  force  and  committed  acts 
of  violence  against  the  inhabitants  of  the  surrounding 
country,  who  asked  for  our  protection. 

Battle  of  Gheran. 
(July  20,  191 2.) 

The  enemy  was  then  dispersed  by  one  of  our  brigades, 
composed  of  mixed  troops,  sent  to  Gheran;  their  activi- 
ties were  thereby  reduced  to  small  attacks  against  our 
outposts  and  redoubts. 

ZONE  OF  DERNA. 

Advance  on  Sidi  Abdallah  II. 
(September  14,  19 12.) 
In  July  the  possession  of  Derna  was  assured  by  the 


\  ì:i  r 


Arming  a  Battery  at  Aiu  Zara. 


73 


Advance  on  Regdaline. 


Cuiiiel  Battery, 


Transporting  Cannon. 


TransDortine  Cannon. 


7d. 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  75 

defensive  belt  of  works,  erected  between  2  to  3  kilometers 
(i  to  2  miles)  from  the  inhabited  center,  and  other  works 
for  immediate  security.  The  enemy's  force,  not  exactly 
computed,  but  judged  to  be  between  eight  and  twelve 
thousand  men,  were  encamped  on  the  left  of  the  ridge, 
out  of  range  of  the  heaviest  artillery.  The  adversary 
were  not  anxious  to  attack  the  encampment,  but  from 
long  range  dropped  a  few  shells,  which  did  no  damage, 
but  gave  ground  for  the  articles  which  appeared  in  the 
foreign  gazettes,  that  we  were  being  besieged  by  the 
troops  of  Enver  Bey.  Having  received  reinforcements, 
and  being  sure  of  the  safety  of  our  base  at  Derna,  on  the 
14th  of  September  we  advanced,  with  the  intent  of  oc- 
cupying Rudero  at  the  head  of  the  Laggati,  to  construct 
an  occasional  work;  and  to  take  up  the  position  of  Kasr 
Ras  el  Leben  and  of  Casa  Aronne  to  protect  the  workmen 
at  Rudero.  The  enemy  refused  to  contest  our  advance, 
and  withdrew  into  the  interior,  but  the  material  and 
moral  results  consequent  to  this  move  were  great,  because 
it  demonstrated  that  we  could  work  and  impose  upon  the 
enemy  at  a  distance  from  our  encampment  and  our  guns 
at  Derna. 

Battle  of  Kasr  Ras  el  Lehen. 
(September  17,  19 12.) 

On  the  15th  and  i6th  of  September  the  enemy  made 
tentative  and  weak  attacks  here  and  there  on  our  front. 
The  17th  was  the  day  of  battle.     This  engagement  was 


76  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

not  preordained  on  our  part,  bur  it  was  a  direct  conse- 
quence of  our  advance  and  the  location  assumed  and 
maintained  from  the  night  of  the  14th. 

The  battle  was  composed  of  three  distinct  actions: 
a  weak  one  early  in  the  morning  on  our  extreme  left,  in 
which  the  enemy  was  easily  repulsed;  the  other  two  re- 
spectively heavy,  at  the  head  of  the  Bent  in  the  morning, 
and  again  on  our  extreme  left  in  the  afternoon  ;  but  in  the 
evening  the  enemy  was  defeated  and  left  the  field  covered 
with  dead  and  wounded. 

On  that  memorable  day  the  Arab-Turk  forces,  several 
thousand  strong,  with  plenty  of  well-commanded  artillery, 
conducted  by  Bnver  Bey,  arrayed  themselves  against  the 
solidity,  calmness,  and  vigor  of  the  counter-attacks  of  our 
troops,  white  and  native,  conducted  by  the  conspicuous 
ability  of  our  officers  and  guided  by  a  clear  conception  of 
tactics,  with  harmonious  and  effectual  opportune  dispo- 
sitions of  troops. 

Our  losses  of  10  officers  and  174  men,  dead  and 
wounded,  were  small  compared  with  those  of  the  enemy, 
of  whom  1,135  were  found  dead  near  our  lines. 

Battles  of  Sidi  Abdallah  III.  and  Braksada. 

(October  8-10,  191 2.) 

To  enlarge  the  line  of  works  in  the  western  zone,  Sidi 
Abdallah  and  Halg  Giaraba  were  occupied  on  October 
8th,  after  having  attacked  and  defeated  the  enemy,  who 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  77 

later,  on  the  loth,  were  again  defeated  at  Bu  Msafer, 
suffering  heavy  losses. 

ZONE  OF  TRIPOLI. 

Battle  of  Sidi  Ahdul-Gelil  or  Zanzur. 
(June  8,  191 2.) 

From  Sidi  Abdul-Gelil  towards  the  south  and  west  of 
Gargaresc,  the  Arab-Turks  managed  Httle  by  little  to 
construct  and  fit  out  a  long  line  of  intrenchments  (Boer 
fashion),  reinforced,  traversed,  blind  covers  and  covered 
passages,  from  which  they  could  advance  towards  our 
front  at  Gargaresc,  while  at  other  points  they  kept  from 
15  to  20  kilometers  (10  to  13  miles)  away  from  our  out- 
posts. Therefore,  it  was  necessary  to  remove  this  menace 
so  close  to  our  line,  and  with  the  fond  hope  that  a  victory 
on  our  part  would  win  over  to  us  the  Urscefifana  Tribe, 
who  were  showing  some  signs  of  discontent;  also  to  de- 
stroy these  trenches  at  Zanzur  that  were  closing  our 
works  at  Gargaresc,  and  which  were  considered  im- 
pregnable. For  military  reasons  and  for  reasons  of 
policy  and  morale,  the  attack  on  Zanzur  was  made  on 
June  8th. 

The  Arab-Turks  tenaciously  defended  the  trenches  of 
Sidi  Abdul-Gelil,  but  our  troops  surmounted  every  ob- 
stacle with  irresistible  impetuosity  and  charged  in  a  long 
Hne  with  the  bayonet.  The  enemy  made  a  desperate 
resistance,  but  were  finally  put  to  rout.     They  fled  to- 


78  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

wards  the  oasis  of  Zanzur,  followed  by  rifle  and  artillery 
fire.  So  that,  after  less  than  four  hours  of  fighting,  the 
treble  and  strong  line  of  intrenchments  of  the  Arab-Turks, 
proclaimed  impregnable,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Italian 
soldiers. 

In  the  meantime  a  hostile  column,  10,000  strong,  at- 
tempted to  turn  our  left  flank,  which  was  operating 
against  Sidi  Abdul-Gelil;  but  two  of  our  reserves  were 
being  held  at  Gargaresc  and  Bu  Meliana,  respectively, 
so  that  while  one  reserve  faced  the  enemy,  the  other  at- 
tacked their  right  flank.  It  was  impossible  to  close  the 
two  reserves  on  the  enemy  before  they  retreated.  Great 
loss  was  suffered  by  the  Arab-Turks. 

On  this  day  we  had  43  killed,  i  officer,  and  278 
wounded,  of  which  13  were  officers.  The  enemy  lost 
about  2,000  dead  and  a  relative  number  of  wounded. 

Our  officers  and  men  did  their  duty  in  an  admirable 
manner,  audaciously  and  with  dash  on  the  offensive, 
calm  and  tenacious  on  the  defensive.  In  the  fourteen 
hours  of  close  combat  and  maneuvering  the  temperature 
fortunately  was  not  as  high  as  it  had  been  on  the  pre- 
ceding days.  The  Ascari  (native  troops)  demonstrated 
their  excellence  as  soldiers  and  the  devotion  they  had  for 
our  flag. 

Battle  of  Sidi  Bilal. 

(September  20,  191 2.) 

The  occupation  of  the  heights  of  Sidi  Abdul-Gehl  gave 
us  the  control  of  the  oasis  of  Zanzur.     With  a  view,  how- 


Wharf  at  Gargaresc. 


79 


TRIPOLI.— Trenches  at  Bu  Meli  ma. 


TRIPOLI.— Oasis. 


TRIPOLI. 


Oasis  of  Feschlum. 


Oasis  South  of  Sciara  Sciat. 


S( 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  8i 

ever,  to  further  operations,  it  was  necessary  to  materially 
secure  the  possession  of  the  oasis  and  to  push  on  towards 
the  hills  that  skirted  it  on  the  south,  to  the  valley  of  Hira; 
and  exactly  on  the  height  of  Sidi  Bilal. 

On  September  20,  191 2,  three  days  after  the  bloody 
defeat  of  Enver  Bey's  troops  at  Dema,  the  enemy  left 
2,000  more  dead  on  the  field  of  battle,  and  their  re- 
sistance around  Tripoli  was  definitely  weakened. 

Our  losses  were  heavy,  but,  compared  with  those  of 
the  enemy,  small  :  10  officers  dead  and  22  wounded;  105 
men  dead  and  411  wounded. 

The  troops  had  to  fight  and  maneuver  on  ground 
difficult  to  march  and  deploy  upon.  The  temperature  at 
certain  hours  was  90  degrees  in  the  shade.  Led  by  officers 
who  set  a  splendid  example,  our  soldiers  of  all  the  arms,  of 
all  the  corps,  and  those  of  the  Colonial  troops,  gave  ad- 
mirable proof  of  endurance  and  elevated  spirit  during  the 
twelve  hours  of  combat. 

ZONE  OF  TOBRUK. 

The  base  at  Tobruk  was  being  gradually  transformed 
into  a  maritime  stronghold,  fortifying  first  on  the  land 
side  and  afterwards  towards  the  sea. 

The  adversary  was  growing  in  numbers,  and  made  a 
great  many  attacks  against  our  works  and  skirmished 
with  our  troops  on  reconnaissance,  but  all  the  engage- 
ments were  limited  in  importance;  and  finally,  finding 
our  defensive  organization  consistent  in  action,  they 
ceased  all  hostiUties  at  the  end  of  July. 


Table  op  Losses  in  the  Principal  Actions. 


Locality. 


ZUARA. 


Tripoli. 


HoMS. 


JVIlSURATA. 

Bengasi. 
Derna. 


TOBRUK. 

The  ^gean. 


Action. 


Combat  of  Bu  Chemesc,  April  23,  19 12 

Combat  of  Sidi  Said,  June  26,  27,  28,  1912  .  . 

Combat  of  Sidi  AH,  July  14,  1912 

Occupation  of  Zuara,  August  6,  19 12 

Combat  and  Occupation  of  Regdaline,  Au- 
gust 15,  1912 

Combat  of  Henni-Sciara-Sciat,  Oct.  23,  1911 . 

Combat  of  Henni-Bu  Meliana,  Oct.  26,  1911 . 

Combat  of  Hamidiè  Battery,  Nov.  6,  1911 .  . 

Combat  of  Henni-Messri,  Nov.  26,  1911  .  .  .  . 

Combat  and  occupation  of  Ain  Zara,  De- 
cember 4,  1911 

Reconnaissance  of  Bir  Tobras,  Dec.  19,  19 11 

Combat  and  occupation  of  Gargaresc,  Janu- 
ary 18-20,  1912 

Second  combat  of  Ain  Zara,  Jan.  28,  19 12  . 

Battle  of  Sidi  Abdul-Gelil  or  Zanzur,  June 
8,  1912 

Battle  of  Sidi  Bilal,  September  20,  1912  .  .  . 

Reconnaissance  of  Lebda,  Dec.  1,1911... 

Combat  and  occupation  of  Mergheb,  Feb- 
ruary 27,  19 12 

Night  combat  of  Mergheb,  March  5-6,  19 12 

Combat  and  occupation  of  Lebda,  May  2, 
1912 

Combat  of  the  Monticelli  of  Lebda,  June  12, 
1912 

Combat  and  occupation  of  Misurata,  July 
8,  1912 

Combat  of  Gheran,  July  20,  19 12 

Landing  from  the  Giuliana  and  conquest  of 
Berca,  October  19,  1911 

Combat  of  Koefia,  November  28,  1911 

Defense  of  Bengasi,  December  25,  1911 

Combat  of  "Two  Palms,"  March  12,  1912  .  . 

Combat  of  November  24,  191 1 

Combat  of  December  16,  1911 

Combat  of  December  27,  1911 

Combat  of  January  17,  1912 

Combat  of  February  1 1-12,  1912 

Combat  of  Sidi  Abdallah  I.,  March  3,  1912  . 

Combat  of  Sidi  Abdallah  IL,  Sept.  14,  1912. 

Combat  of  Kasr  Ras  el  Leben,  September 
17,  1912 

Combat  of  Sidi  Abdallah  III.  and  of  Brak- 
sada,  October  8-10,  1912 

Combat  of  Hagiass  Nadra,  Dec.  22,  1912  .  .  . 

Combat  of  Psitos,  May  16-17,  1912 

Total 


Dead  and 
Wounded. 


Officers.  Men 


5 
21 
18 


14 
32 


13 
I 

4 

4 

7 
6 

ID 

3 

17 
2 


I 

22 
2 


236 


63 
236 

82 


122 
482 
172 

19 
119 

123 
89 

67 
14 

320 

516 

14 

80 
5 

59 

86 

135 
"3 

95 
67 

160 
74 
24 

108 

14 

60 

227 

II 

174 

93 
20 

2,0 


4.076 


Besides  the  above,  the  following  were  lost  in  minor  engagements  at  the 
various  garrisons  during  the  year  of  war,  up  to  and  including  Januarj'  16, 
1912:  Officers  and  men,  5,652;  of  whom  1,432  died.  Illness  and  disease, 
1,948  died. 


Radio-Telegraph  at  Bengasi. 


*1»^<g<Mb-t#i»^Ji»^^ 


83 


Ascension  of  the  Dirigible  "Draclicn." 


TRIPOLI .— Cattle'Corral . 


Il 


Observations  with  the  ''Drachen." 


TRIPOLI.- — Forage  Department. 


84 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  85 

CHAPTER  III. 

The  Various  Arms. 

The  mobilization  carefully  and  promptly  organized; 
the  dash,  the  physical  and  moral  resistance,  and  the  tech- 
nical knowledge  of  our  troops;  the  enthusiasm  of  the 
country  for  whom  the  enterprise  was  to  be  undertaken 
— all  were  important  factors  towards  success.  The  war, 
however,  wore  out  energy  and  consumed  ammunition  and 
materiel  of  all  descriptions;  but  no  enterprise,  without 
continued  superiority  of  spirit  to  vivify  it,  even  if  excel- 
lently prepared,  well  initiated  and  well  conducted,  can 
conclude  with  a  final  victory. 

Therefore  it  is  necessary  to  have  a  complete  netful 
of  logical  resources  to  meet  the  varied  and  important 
needs  of  the  operating  force  ;  but  it  required  a  great  deal 
of  foresight  and  a  large  amount  of  energy  to  complete 
this  fatiguing  work,  so  obscure  and  devoid  of  tangible 
satisfaction. 

Of  these  qualities  the  personnel  of  all  the  arms  gave 
distinct  proof  in  our  recent  war,  in  which  the  work  of  the 
Quartermaster's  Corps  was  particularly  arduous,  owing 
to  the  uncertain  maritime  communications  and  the  diffi- 
culty of  finding  a  landing-place  in  Libya;  their  work  was 
excellent  and  complete.  They  had  to  provide  not  only 
for  collecting  and  sending  to  the  theater  of  war  provisions 
and  materiel    of   ordinary   quaHty,   for   the   removal    of 


86  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

sick  and  wounded,  of  prisoners,  of  materiel  that  could 
no  longer  be  utilized,  but  had  also  to  furnish  firewood, 
drinking-water,  and  rations. 

Naples  was  selected  as  the  principal  base  of  operations 
for  the  depot  of  provisions  and  materiel,  and  ports  in 
Sicily  were  used  as  minor  bases. 

An  idea  of  the  transportation  required  from  October 
to  December,  191 1,  can  be  had  from  the  following: 

Ships  sailed  from  Naples  to  Libya 141 

Ships  sailed  from  Sicily  to  Libya 25 

Men  transported 90,000 

Horses  and  mules 12,000 

Cattle 10,000 

Merchandise  and  various  materiel  (tons)   40,000 

Forty-two  ships  were  hired,  but  only  thirty-two  were 
used;  the  Quartermaster  retaining  the  balance  of  the 
transports  for  the  eventual  transportation  of  10,000  troops 
with  their  equipment. 

With  this  fleet  of  transports  it  was  thought  to  establish 
a  Une  of  communication  to  whatever  point  was  occupied 
on  the  coast  of  Libya,  in  order  to  insure  the  deh  very  of 
equipment  and  materiel;  besides  a  certain  number  of 
ships  to  be  retained  for  an  emergency,  either  to  transport 
men  or  materiel.  But  as  soon  as  this  was  suggested,  it 
became  necessary  to  send  more  detachments  to  the  new 
occupations;  and  the  condition  of  the  sea  was  especially 
bad  at  this  season  of  the  year,  this  making  it  obligatory 
to  meet  the  necessities  of  the  troops  as  the  occasion  re- 
quired and  without  any  plans  as  to  regular  trips. 

The  continued  heavy  seas,  and  the  fact  that  all  the 
occupied  points  had  neither  harbors  nor  breakwaters, 


Search  Lights. 


87 


TKiroLl.— Hangar  Destroyed  by  Cyclone  December  10,  1911. 


Dirigible  Launched  at  Sea. 


mm 


H 


BENGASI.— A  Section  of  the  Line  of  Security. 


88 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  89 

but  were  simply  open  beaches  (except  perhaps  Tripoh, 
whose  harbor  was  only  slightly  protected),  caused  the 
Quartermaster's  Corps  great  anxiety;  notwithstanding  the 
fact  that  they  tried  to  break  the  seas  by  a  system  of 
anchorage  in  echelon,  several  tows  were  capsized  and  lost. 

Therefore  during  the  winter  of  1911-12  it  was  im- 
possible to  maintain  a  regular  establishment  of  provisions 
at  the  secondary  depots  on  the  Libyan  coast,  and  it  was 
with  great  effort  that  the  Quartermaster's  Department 
provided  daily  rations. 

Having  profited  by  this  experience,  the  department 
decided  to  store  ninety  days'  provisions  at  the  various 
depots,  instead  of  fifteen  days'  stores  as  was  at  first 
planned,  in  order  to  prevent  any  shortage  during  the 
winter  of  191 2-13. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  department  had  few  ships 
left  for  the  actual  transportation  of  stores  when  the  fol- 
lowing is  taken  into  consideration:  the  transportation 
of  new  detachments  to  Macabez,  Rhodes,  Misurata,  and 
Zuara,  and  the  return  to  Italy  of  invalids  and  the  dis- 
charged and  substitutions  for  the  Classes  of  1888- 1889. 

Following  is  a  table  of  transportation  : 

Ships  sailed  from  Naples 185 

Men  transported  from  Italy  to  Libya  to  establish  new  garrisons  and 

for  the  substitution  of  the  Classes  of  1888-1889 124,000 

Returned  to  Italy  from  Libya 70,000 

Horses  and  mules  transported 12,000 

Cattle 9,500 

Merchandise  and  various  materiel  (tons) 85,000 

This  department  also  provided  water  (which  was 
brought  from  Italy  in  tank  steamers),  material  to  build 


90  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

the  depots,  means  to  transport  the  water  on  shore,  ice 
(which  was  sent  from  Italy),  and  later  estabhshed  ice 
machines  ashore.  Ice  was  furnished  the  firing-line  in  small 
boxes,  specially  made.  All  measures  were  taken  to  keep 
the  health  standard  of  the  troops  high.  With  this  end  in 
view,  mineral  water  and  lemons  were  provided,  the  gar- 
risons were  equipped  with  modern  improvements  to  pre- 
vent an  epidemic,  the  most  effective  cures  and  medicines 
were  supplied,  and  hospitals  with  most  recent  improve- 
ments were  constructed. 

To  transport  the  sick  and  wounded  to  Italy,  hospital 
ships  were  used  ;  four  in  the  first  stage  of  the  war,  and  two 
from  April,  191 2,  to  the  end.  These  ships  were  sched- 
uled to  touch  at  each  garrison  two  or  three  times  a  month  ; 
the  sick  and  wounded  were  then  sent  to  the  civil  and 
military  hospitals  in  Sicily,  Naples,  and  Tuscany. 

During  the  war  23,921  sick  and  2,802  wounded  were 
sent  to  Italy. 

Necessary  numbers  of  horses,  mules,  and  carts  were 
furnished.  Camels  were  used  for  transportation  into  the 
interior;  300  auto-wagons  were  also  used,  which  gave 
proof  that  this  system  of  transportation  is  an  excellent 
one  and  can  be  used  in  a  country  devoid  of  roads.  Rail- 
road material  was  furnished,  and  was  used  on  roads  that 
had  been  constructed  or  were  completed  by  us.  An 
enormous  amount  (60,000  tons)  of  building  material  was 
furnished  for  civil  and  military  work. 

The  Quartermaster's  Department  cooperated  efficiently 
with  all  civil  and  military  operations  during  the  year  of 


^ 


TRIPOLI.— Photograp])  Taken  from  a  Dirigible  at  an  Altitude  of  400  Meters. 


91 


Photograph  'I'akcn  fromjuDirigible  at  aH  Altitiidf  of  101)  .Mrtcrs.] 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  93 

war  ;  constantly  inspiring  the  command  by  the  fact  that 
at  no  time  was  there  any  anxiety  lest  the  troops  should 
lack  proper  requirements. 

The  ArtilIvEy. 

In  the  shortest  time,  and  with  unfavorable  conditions 
at  sea,  we  were  able  to  land  numerous  field  and  mountain 
guns  and  a  great  supply  of  materiel;  to  get  rapidly  into 
action,  and  to  overcome  difficulties  in  transportation  not 
light,  owing  to  the  nature  of  the  sandy  and  hilly  soil,  or 
because  of  rain.  Even  the  artillery  of  medium  caliber 
(guns  149-6-inch  and  mortars  210-8-inch)  was  rapidly 
landed  and  transported  with  only  ud  mentary  means 
across  muddy  ways  to  arm  the  batteries.  Magazines 
were  constructed,  and  a  great  quantity  of  ammunition 
and  explosives  were  stored;  repair  shops  were  built  for 
artillery  and  wagon  accessories,  and  reserve  depots  con- 
ttructed  for  materiel,  arms,  and  ammunition  (our  own  and 
that  captured  from  the  enemy).  This  labor  was  ex- 
tremely difficult  when  dealing  with  the  temperature  and 
the  fine  sandy  soil  in  which  they  worked.  The  workers 
had  to  understand  the  duties  of  gunsmiths,  mechanics, 
armorers,  carpenters,  saddlers,  plumbers,  etc.  Repair 
shops  were  set  up  for  small  arms,  harness,  bicycles, 
stoves  and  pots,  telephone  apparatus,  tents,  sappers' 
tools,  pumps,  etc.  The  workshops  of  Tripoli  provided 
the  needs  of  the  smaller  garrisons,  made  shields  for  the 
artillery  (75-A,  3-inch,  and  70-2,  6-inch)  and  mountain 


94  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

guns,  tall  enough  to  protect  a  camel  lying  down  and  in- 
vulnerable to  ordinary  fire;  made  equipments  and  acces- 
sories for  regular  consumption,  and  finally  the  workmen 
constructed  barracks  and  made  roofs. 

Experiments  were  continually  going  on  in  the  artillery  : 
substituting  mules  for  horses  ;  the  use  of  a  loose,  springy, 
padded  tire  for  the  carriages;  to  safeguard  the  stowing 
of  ammunition  and  powder  away  from  the  direct  rays  of 
the  sun;  to  maintain  telephone  communication  between 
batteries,  spotters,  and  battery  commanders'  stations. 

Finally  camels  were  substituted  as  the  leading  haul- 
ing power  for  the  artillery,  for  the  following  logical,  eco- 
nomical, and  tactical  reasons:  they  withstood  the  long 
marches  without  fatigue;  they  could  be  fed  from  local 
pastures,  and  could  go  several  days  without  drinking; 
they  would  He  down  during  action,  offering  a  small  target, 
and  are  insensible  to  fire;  they  are  easily  guided  and 
watched,  cost  less  than  other  quadrupeds,  are  fed  at  a 
small  cost,  and,  finally,  do  not  suffer  from  the  extreme 
heat. 

Engineer  Corps. 

This  corps  also  had  its  chance  to  distinguish  itself, 
overcoming,  with  few  resources,  all  climatic  obstacles  and 
the  enemy  who  opposed  its  work;  starting  this  work  by 
building  landing  docks  with  alacrity. 

The  troops  of  this  corps  greatly  helped  the  other 
branches  of  the  service  with  the  perfection  of  their  first 
defenses  as  well  as  the  succeeding  ones,  and  in  the  clear- 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  95 

ings  for  an  open  field  of  view  and  fire,  and  a  line  of  com- 
munications. They  took  part  in  all  the  combats  with 
admirable  spirit  and  sacrifice,  without  any  saving  of 
fatigue  or  blood. 

Their  work  can  be  judged  by  the  result.  The  sappers 
built  all  works  on  the  coast  occupied  by  us,  and  in  the 
zone  of  Tripoli  alone  the  intrenchments  were  20  kilometers 
(14  miles)  long,  constructed  with  every  care  to  render 
them  safe  and  healthy.  They  also  constructed  various 
batteries,  field  redoubts,  and  semi-permanent  trenches, 
and  about  600,000  yards  of  accessory  defenses,  and  cleared 
the  field  of  fire  in  the  oases,  difficult  and  treacherous  be- 
cause of  the  impenetrable  mud-holes,  thick  vegetation, 
and  palm  trees. 

The  engineers  did  not  omit  anything  that  would 
assist  them  in  gaining  their  ends  or  material,  with  the 
idea  in  view  of  adapting  themselves  to  any  exigency  that 
would  arise  from  the  condition  of  the  terrain  or  the  mode 
of  combat  of  the  enemy.  They  became  so  skilled  in  their 
work  that  in  a  few  hours  after  a  combat  and  conquest 
they  could  erect  defensive  positions  that  would  withstand 
any  sort  of  attack  from  the  enemy. 

Normal  barracks  and  tents  were  modified  to  meet  the 
requirements  of  the  climate  and  ground.  Barracks  were 
constructed  so  that  all  hydraulic  and  hygienic  measures 
were  considered,  and  all  sorts  of  mechanical  contrivances 
were  used  to  obtain  water  from  the  wells. 

This  corps  were  also  actively  engaged  in  starting 
a  telegraph    and    telephone    system.     At    Tobruk    they 


96  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

stretched  a  telephone  net  of  40  kilometers  (26  miles), 
using  about  60  kilometers  (40  miles)  of  wire,  partly  on 
poles,  partly  underground,  partly  flying;  at  Bengasi  the 
telegraph  and  telephone  line  reached  132  kilometers  (88 
miles);  at  Tripoli  195  kilometers  (  130  miles)  of  perman- 
ent telegraph  line  was  installed,  partly  underground  and 
partly  on  poles;  40  kilometers  (26  miles)  of  telephone; 
50  telegraphic,  50  telephonic,  and  12  signal  stations,  pro- 
ducing, daily  2,000  despatches.  Installations  of  minor 
character  were  made  at  other  garrisons. 

At  the  same  time  with  the  telegraph,  the  radio- 
telegraph was  brilliantly  justified.  On  the  14th  of  Oc- 
tober, Tripoli  was  communicating  with  the  Navy,  con- 
tinuing in  this  way  to  maintain  rapid  transmission,  con- 
tributing to  that  mutual  and  perfect  cooperation  between 
Army  and  Navy  which  has  been  largely  dealt  with  all 
through  this  report.  By  November,  TripoU,  Homs,  Lam- 
pedusa, and  Vittoria  were  connected  up;  after  the  visit 
of  Mr.  Marconi,  and  on  his  advice,  eight  stations  were 
erected;  31,000  radio-telegrams  were  sent,  showing  the 
importance  of  this  system  in  warfare.  Various  experi- 
ments were  made  in  using  mules  and  camels  as  the  means 
of  transporting  wireless  equipment. 

The  use  of  the  dirigible  Drachcn  was  important.  It 
was  used  by  spotters  both  at  sea  and  ashore  to  watch  the 
effect  of  our  fire  upon  the  enemy.  At  sea  the  dirigible 
was  tendered  by  a  specially  fitted  ship.  The  spotters  in 
the  dirigible  were  able  to  watch  the  effect  of  our  fire  in  the 


DERNA. — ^A  Section  of  the  Line  of  Security. 


97 


TRIPOLI.  -A  Street. 


TRIPOLI.— A  Street  in  the  Cavalry  Barracks. 


TRIPOLI  .—Bakeshop . 


98 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  99 

density  of  the  oases,  and  at  night,  by  the  use  of  search- 
light, they  were  able  to  locate  the  enemy. 

In  long-distance  reconnaissances  both  dirigibles  and 
aeroplanes  were  used. 

The  first  flight  was  made  at  Tripoli  on  October  22, 
191 1  ;  later,  flights  were  made  at  Bengasi  (November, 
191 1),  Tobruk  (December,  191 1),  and  at  Derna,  Ferua, 
and  Zuara  (in  March,  April,  and  August,  191 1,  respect- 
ively). The  two  airships  P2  and  Pj  were  launched  at 
Tripoli  in  March  from  the  only  hangar,  as  the  other 
hangar  had  been  destroyed  by  a  hurricane  December  i6th. 
The  first  ascension  was  made  March  5,  191 1,  and  later 
with  such  frequency  as  the  weather  conditions  permitted. 

During  the  period  of  hostilities  ninety  ascensions  were 
made.  Both  ships  made  flights  simultaneously,  in  order 
that  they  might  render  each  other  assistance  in  case  of 
accident. 

At  Bengasi  the  dirigible  Pi  arrived  the  nth  of  May, 
191 2,  and  remained  until  the  15th  of  July,  making  nine 
ascensions. 

Explorative  and  offensive  reconnaissances  were  made 
by  both  aeroplanes  and  dirigibles.  The  observers  in  the 
aeroplanes  followed  the  traffic  to  ascertain  the  destination 
and  source  of  provisions  furnished  to  the  enemy,  discov- 
ered the  oases  occupied  by  them,  and  located  their  de- 
fenses, the  camps  of  the  Turks  and  the  Arabs,  with  their 
depots,  etc. 

The  offensive  flights  were  accomplished  by  dropping 
bombs  on  the  enemy. 


loo  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

Unfortunately,  the  weather  conditions  did  not  always 
permit  flights  during  action.  The  dropping  of  bombs, 
while  they  did  no  material  damage,  had  a  wonderful 
moral  effect.  Our  troops  were  the  first  in  the  world  to 
use  this  method  of  offense.  Excellent  photographs  were 
also  taken  by  the  air  squad,  which  were  highly  important 
to  our  intelligence  department  and  for  the  compilation 
of  maps. 

The  aerial  navigation  and  aviation  rendered  excellent 
service,  reporting  the  character  of  the  ground  and  taking 
particular  observations,  especially  in  Tripoli.  They  fa- 
cilitated work,  which  would  have  been  hard  to  accom- 
plish in  an  ordinary  theater  of  war,  in  mountainous 
country,  rich  with  vegetation  and  natural  obstacles,  and 
against  an  enemy  furnished  with  arms  capable  of  hitting 
the  bird-men.  The  value  of  this  experiment,  which  Italy 
had  the  fortune  to  effect  for  the  first  time  in  history,  will 
furnish  a  treasure  for  the  future. 

To  return  to  the  works,  the  systematizing  of  the  bases, 
and  the  special  study  and  work  required  to  make  them  a 
definite  assest:  Works  of  a  permanent  character  were 
constructed,  and  a  line  of  security  to  guarantee  the  safety 
of  the  bases  from  the  depredations  of  a  possible  mass- 
attack  of  the  Arabs,  who,  regardless  of  consequences, 
would  probably  have  tried  to  enter  the  city;  a  wall  of 
masonry  high  enough  to  prevent  surprise  was  built. 

With  limited  means  at  hand,  there  was  commenced 
the  construction  of  barracks,  offices,  and  magazines,  and 
foundations  were  laid  for  hospitals.     Depots  and  store- 


TRIPOLI.— Magazines. 


B^B*^'!S5r" 

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^^^ 

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r'-    ^  -  "  -H  ■    *  *  ' 

F 

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Bn.T'^ìISTr '39H 

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101 


TRIPOLI.— Water  Department. 


TRIPOLI.— Auto-Wagons. 


TRIPOLI.— Camel  Corral. 


102 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  103 

rooms  for  merchandise,  ammunition,  and  materiel,  ovens 
and  foundries,  reservoirs  to  insure  the  retention  of  water, 
with  steriUzers  and  pumps  with  motor  power,  were 
installed. 

Sanitary  Service. 

The  Sanitary  Corps  and  the  Red  Cross  rapidly  in- 
stalled their  respective  establishments,  perfecting  them, 
as  conditions  required,  to  meet  the  climate,  the  troops, 
and  the  surroundings,  so  that  the  care  of  the  sick  and 
wounded  was  facilitated.  They  improved  the  antique 
military  hospitals  of  the  Turks,  and  erected  several  con- 
valescence wards  for  the  complete  recovery  of  those  dis- 
charged from  the  sick  wards  before  sending  them  to  duty. 

The  sickness  that  predominated  was  of  an  intestinal 
character,  and  in  the  rainy  season  rheumatism.  The 
daily  proportion  of  sick  varied  between  a  minimum  of 
1.30  in  the  month  of  March  and  a  maximum  of  2.10  in 
the  month  of  October,  for  each  1,000  men.  The  general 
health  of  the  troops  was  very  satisfactory;  and  the  sani- 
tary corps  were  present  in  every  combat,  giving  first  aid, 
and  at  times  resorting  to  arms  to  defend  the  hospital  from 
the  barbarous  aggressors.  The  manner  in  which  they 
fought  and  stamped  out  the  epidemic  of  cholera  amongst 
the  inhabitants,  which,  if  it  had  broken  out  in  the  ranks, 
probably  would  have  resulted  in  compromising  the  en- 
terprise, is  a  matter  which  cannot  be  exaggerated. 

How  the  Sanitary  Corps  assisted  the  civil  authorities 
in  this  will  be  succinctly  told  in  a  following  chapter. 


I04  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

Commissary  Department. 

The  organization  of  this  department  was  perfect  from 
the  first  days  of  our  occupation,  and  maintained  through- 
out the  whole  campaign.  Difficulties  of  landing  stores, 
owing  to  heavy  seas,  and  the  many  adverse  obstacles 
which  are  contended  with  when  a  rapid  collection  and  dis- 
tribution of  merchandise  and  materiel  is  made,  were  over- 
come, due  to  the  intelHgence  and  to  the  inexhaustible 
spirit  of  abnegation  demonstrated  by  the  personnel,  and 
again  in  the  last  days  of  October,  in  Tripoli,  by  the  sacri- 
fice of  blood. 

Although  the  provisions  had  been  a  long  time  on  board 
and  then  on  beaches  and  landings,  conglomerated  with 
materiel  of  all  descriptions,  and  lacking  the  proper  means 
of  cover  from  the  intemperate  weather,  yet  they  were 
able  to  furnish  the  troops  with  fresh  provisions  and  bread 
in  good  condition,  during  action  and  at  points  distant 
from  the  depot  of  supplies. 

Little  by  little  conditions  were  perfected.  During  the 
first  few  days  bread  was  made  on  board  the  ships;  then 
the  field  ovens  were  used,  and  finally  the  brick  ovens 
abandoned  by  the  Turks,  which  were  partly  recon- 
structed. Successively  store-rooms  were  built  for  the 
daily  and  reserve  provisions.  The  transportation  of 
stores  was  facilitated  by  constructing  railroads,  when 
those  captured  did  not  answer.  Branch  subsistence  de- 
pots were  established  in  the  vast  zone  of  Tripoli  at  Ain 
Zara,  Tagiura,  Gargaresc,  Fornaci,  Trik  Taruna,  Sidi  Ab- 


TRIPOLI. — Interior  of  Mosque  of  the  Caramanli. 


106 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  107 

dul-Gelil,  Gheran;  with  brick  ovens  at  Ain  Zara,  Tagi- 
ura,  and  Sidi  Abdul-Gelil. 

Experiments  were  made  at  all  the  bases  relative  to  the 
subsistence  of  men  and  animals,  and  the  rations  were 
varied  and  increased  daily. 

As  has  been  stated,  the  special  difficulties  experienced 
in  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  did  not  have  any  effect 
on  the  troops,  but  to  obtain  this  result  it  took  a  consid- 
erable amount  of  energy  to  meet  their  wants.  At  Tripoli, 
for  instance,  there  were  distributed  during  the  year  of 
war  12,600,000  rations,  with  an  average  of  34,000  rations 
daily;  10,000  horses  and  mules,  3,000  camels,  and  1,500 
head  of  cattle  consumed  1,200  cwt.  of  hay  and  1,000  cwt. 
of  oats  and  barley;  260,000  cwt.  of  wood,  with  a  daily 
average  of  800  cwt.,  was  also  consumed. 

At  Bengasi,  during  the  campaign,  4,500,000  rations, 
with  a  daily  average  of  13,000  rations,  were  issued;  6,500 
head  of  cattle  were  slaughtered,  and  there  was  a  daily 
consumption  of  200  cwt.  of  wood,  140  cwt.  of  oats  and 
barley,  and  320  cwt.  of  hay  and  straw. 

Analogous  in  proportion  were  the  other  issues  of  the 
commissariat — those  of  uniforms,  equipment,  and  pay; 
and  not  everything  was  obtained  from  the  mother  coun- 
try, but,  where  possible,  from  local  sources,  thereby  caus- 
ing the  resumption  of  activities  in  market  and  industries, 
large  and  small. 

Transportation  . 
The  enormity  of  the  work  attached  to  the  construction 


io8  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

of  bases  and  the  landing  of  stores  called  into  service  land 
transportation. 

The  work  was  arduous,  owing  to  the  scarcity  of  floats, 
lighters,  tug-boats,  and  wharves,  and  the  continuous 
heavy  seas;  add  to  this  the  large  number  of  troops  of 
each  arm,  materiel  of  all  sorts,  quadrupeds,  cannon  and 
their  carriages,  which  had  to  be  landed  with  that  urgency 
which  the  warlike  exigencies  demanded. 

Finally  new  Ughters  were  collected  and  wharves  and 
landing-stages  were  constructed  by  military  and  private 
concerns.  These  things,  however,  preoccupied  the  regu- 
lar functions  of  this  service  ;  yet  the  troops  did  not  in  any 
way  suffer,  nor  did  the  necessities,  for  use  on  the  field  of 
action,  thanks  to  the  activities  of  this  corps. 

The  land  transportation  assumed  vast  proportions 
from  the  outset.  The  difficulties  attending  the  landing 
of  stores  in  restricted  spaces  neqessarily  caused  some 
confusion  of  merchandise  and  materiel,  which  later  had 
to  be  sorted  and  then  sent  to  the  depots  and  organizations 
and  to  the  troops  on  the  firing-line. 

It  was  necessary  to  estabHsh  a  vigorous  and  active 
organization,  always  prepared  to  meet,  not  only  the  or- 
dinary demands,  but  also  those  arising  from  unforeseen 
circumstances,  as  well  as  to  be  ready  to  meet  the  require- 
ments of  whatever  expedition  the  mihtary  situation  re- 
quired, going  a  long  distance  from  the  base  and  into  an 
inhospitable  country. 

As  soon  as  Tripoli  was  occupied,  the  idea  occurred  to 
experiment  with  auto-trucks;  this  was  done  successfully 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  109 

and  at  nearly  all  points  occupied,  but  naturally  160  out 
of  the  300  sent  to  Libya  were  used  in  the  zone  of  Tripoli, 
owing  to  the  extent  of  operations. 

This  new  method  of  transportation  resulted  in  the 
rapid  clearing  of  the  wharves  and  transmitting  the  stores 
to  the  troops,  transporting  construction  materials,  re- 
moval of  camp  equipage,  and  carrying  ammunition  and 
rations  to  the  firing-line.  We  therefore  had  ample  proof 
from  this  complex  work — the  long  daily  trips  made  over 
desert  and  variable  ground — that  inspired  complete  faith 
in  this  mode  of  transportation  to  follow  the  troops,  under 
any  circumstances  and  for  long  distances,  with  great 
saving  of  time  and  fatigue,  besides  the  ordinary  services 
required  by  the  presence  of  many  troops  on  a  warlike 
mission. 

Veterinary  Service. 

The  hygienic  and  sanitary  conditions  of  the  quad- 
rupeds were  always  excellent,  as  were  their  nutrition  and 
suitability,  notwithstanding  the  long  and  hard  marches, 
the  prolonged  stay  aboard  vessels,  the  climate,  and  the 
heavy  work. 

There  were,  especially  in  Tripoli,  several  cases  of  in- 
fectious diseases,  provoked  by  the  inevitable  contact 
with  native  animals.  Energetic  measures  were  taken  to 
combat  these  diseases  and  to  provide  means  to  insure 
vigilant  care  of  the  animals.  Thus  the  spread  was  not 
only  prevented,  but  stamped  out,  by  the  active  work  and 
the  intelligent  care  of  the  veterinary  surgeons. 


no  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

Postal  Service. 

The  difficulty  of  a  convenient  system  and  the  quantity 
of  work,  from  the  first  moment,  caused  by  the  large 
number  of  troops  and  their  consequent  manifold  relations 
with  the  mother  country,  confronted  this  service  at  the 
initiation  of  the  campaign;  it  became  more  complicated, 
owing  to  the  irregularities  in  the  arrivals  and  departures 
of  the  postal  vessels,  caused  by  the  conditions  of  the  seas, 
and  the  continuous  augmenting  of  the  forces  of  the  corps 
of  occupation,  the  unexpected  change  of  detail  of  troops 
in  the  various  zones,  the  numerous  departures  for  Italy, 
and  the  substitutions  therefor. 

A  patient,  dutiful,  and  devoted  personnel  faced  all 
these  difficulties  with  a  true  spirit  of  abnegation. 

To  facilitate  the  correspondence  of  the  troops  with 
their  famiUes  and  vice  versa,  in  a  manner  suitable  even 
for  those  who  knew  only  how  to  sign  their  names,  a  special 
post  card  was  issued,  on  which  an  appropriate  phrase  was 
printed,  which  was  distributed  gratuitously.  The  Min- 
ister of  Posts  (Postmaster  General)  also  provided  the 
troops  gratuitously  with  thousands  of  post  cards,  larger 
than  the  regular  size,  and  envelopes.  The  troops  were 
allowed  to  frank  all  mail. 


'^i^ 


Construction  of  a  Wharf. 


Ill 


MACABEZ. — Constructing  a  Dam  across  the  Bav. 


o 

I— I 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  113 

CHAPTER  IV. 
The  Civil  Administration  and  Its  Policy. 

The  activity  of  the  service  had  civil  as  well  as  military 
dealings  with  the  natives,  and  laid  the  foundation  for  a 
progress  which  we  intended  to  introduce  into  a  land  that 
had  long  remained  abandoned. 

The  consequent  result  was  a  vast  and  complex  work, 
and,  given  the  state  of  war,  had  to  be  proceeded  with 
gradually  and  effectually. 

With  just  foresight,  it  was  desirous  of  developing  a 
policy  which  would  conduce  to  an  effectual  affirmation 
of  our  sovereignty  over  all  Libya  in  the  briefest  time  and 
with  as  Httle  loss  of  blood  as  possible.  This  would  tend 
to  reduce  the  inevitable  rancor  originated  by  the  war  and 
to  establish  a  sure  and  cordial  support. 

To  instill  the  proper  spirit  in  the  Arabs,  they  had  to  be 
coerced  and  at  times  punished  in  an  exemplary  manner, 
to  obtain  respect  for  and  fear  of  our  power;  they  were 
convinced  by  continuous  proof  of  our  desne  to  introduce 
into  their  country  a  new  era  of  good-will  and  prosperity, 
respecting  their  beliefs,  their  customs,  and  traditions. 

The  mihtary  authorities  initiated  this  alone.  The 
men,  directed  by  the  officers,  carried  on  this  work  during 
the  first  few  months  of  the  war,  but  immediately  after- 
wards, especially  in  Tripoli,  they  received  the  intelligent 


n4  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

assistance  of  the   civil  authorities  sent  from   Italy   to 
colonize  Libya. 

The  dual  activity  of  the  civil  and  military  authorities, 
who  were  in  complete  and  cordial  accord,  netted  the  re- 
sults which  were  arrived  at  in  a  few  months  and  that 
were  especially  notable  in  the  principal  centers. 

Landing-Places. 

As  has  been  stated,  the  first  and  probably  the  gravest 
difficulties  that  were  encountered  were  the  absence  of 
landing-places  for  our  troops  on  the  coast  of  Libya  (beaten 
frequently  by  violent  seas)  and  the  absence  of  harbor 
facilities. 

Work  was  immediately  begun  to  improve  the  harbors 
and  systematize  in  the  best  manner  possible  the  anchor- 
ages; to  construct  landing-places,  wharves,  store-houses, 
and  cranes  for  the  rapid  landing  of  stores.  Excavations 
were  also  made;  and  at  Macabez  a  canal  was  dug  to  a 
depth  of  4>2  feet,  allowing  the  passage  of  small  craft. 

Naturally,  the  major  portion  of  this  work  was  done 
in  the  two  principal  ports,  Tripoli  and  Bengasi.  The 
wharves  here  were  more  substantial,  larger  and  longer, 
and  the  cranes  heavier.  Tracks  were  laid  on  the  wharves, 
and  the  merchandise  transferred  to  the  store-houses  or  to 
the  main  railroad  line  by  train. 

Survey. 
It  was  essential,  for  military  purposes,  to  know  the 


TRIPOLI. — A  Breakwater'under  Construction. 


TORRUK.— Aiuia  VuUev. 


TRIPOLI.— Railway  Station. 


RHODES.— Mount  Smith. 


116 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  117 

topography  of  Libya.  We  had  approximate  and  incom- 
plete knowledge  of  the  surrounding  country,  especially 
of  Cyrenaica,  which  was  not  widely  traveled.  A  com- 
mission from  the  Military  Geographic  Institute,  from  the 
first  days  of  the  occupation,  began  at  Tripoli  a  study  of 
the  geodetic  and  topographical  conditions,  and  promptly 
turned  out  maps  of  Libya  on  various  scales  and  of  suf- 
ficient accuracy,  in  spite  of  the  insufficient  methods  of 
reproduction. 

Roads,  Streets,  and  Railways. 

The  roads,  even  in  the  proximity  of  the  inhabited 
centers,  were  deficient  and  in  some  places  obsolete  or 
reduced  to  broken  paths. 

This  was  the  case  at  Derna.  When  the  communica- 
tions between  the  littoral  and  the  higher  plane  were 
difficult,  at  first  paths  were  made,  then  transformed  into 
trails,  and  finally  into  roads  for  wagon-travel.  In  some 
places  the  road-building  was  difficult,  and  in  one  place 
we  cut  through  rock  for  2,500  meters  (2,735  yards).  Ar- 
riving on  the  higher  plane,  the  work  became  easier,  and 
roads  were  built  connecting  Marabutto,  Sidi  Abdallah,  and 
Segnale  on  one  side,  and  Kasr  Ras  el  Leben  and  Casa 
Aronne  on  the  other.  The  first  road,  when  completed, 
would  reach  Ain  Mara,  and  the  second  would  become  the 
principal  communication  towards  Mantuba  and  Bomba. 

Along  the  shore  and  the  wider  roads  of  the  plain 
narrow-gauge  railroads  were  laid  and  animal  power  used, 
principally  to  carry  water.     An  aerial  cable  300  meters 


ii8  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

(310  yards)  long  was  stretched  across  the  valley  of 
Giaraba,  to  which  a  car  capable  of  carrying  200  kilograms 
(450  pounds)  was  attached,  so  that  a  haul  up  and  down 
the  mountain-side  was  saved. 

At  Bengasi  the  work  of  road-building  was  not  as  dif- 
ficult as  at  Derna.  A  road  was  built  from  Bengasi  to 
Giuliana  (a  drawbridge  was  built  across  the  Sibback)  ;  to 
the  oasis  of  Foeyat  (where  the  water  was  potable)  ;  to 
Sabri  and  the  various  field-works.  On  this  road  narrow- 
gauge  tracks  were  laid,  facilitating  the  hauling  of  water, 
and  so  forth. 

At  Tobruk,  where  the  ground  was  rough  and  broken, 
a  number  of  difficulties  had  to  be  overcome.  However, 
21  kilometers  (14  miles)  of  roads  were  built,  which  could 
be  used  by  auto-trucks,  with  a  view  to  the  future  use  by 
the  towns,  connecting  them  with  the  caravan  trails  of 
Solum  and  Derna. 

In  the  other  garrisons  of  Libya  secondary  roads  were 
built  to  meet  the  immediate  requirements  of  the  troops. 

At  Tripoli,  however,  from  the  first  days  of  our  occu- 
pation, a  narrow-gauge  track  was  laid  connecting  the 
wharves  with  magazines  and  warehouses,  and,  with  a 
view  towards  operations  into  the  interior  and  the  future 
railroad  of  Libya,  60  kilometers  (40  miles)  of  tracks  were 
requisitioned  from  Italy  and  laid. 

In  March,  191 2,  railroads  connected  Tripoli  with  Ain 
Zara  ;  in  April,  with  Gargaresc  ;  and  from  this  line  ran  a 
spur  connecting  with  the  quarries,  for  the  transport  of 
stone  used  in  construction.     In  July  the  railroad  from 


Fountain  at  Zanzur,  Constructed  by  Soldiers. 


119 


Re8er\'oir  at  Bii  M eliana. 


Panorama  of  Misurata. 


A  Water  Maia  at  Berna. 


120 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  121 

Tripoli  to  Tagiura  was  completed,  and  in  the  beginning 
of  September  the  tracks  were  extended  from  Gargaresc  to 
Zanzur. 

In  the  meantime  a  central  depot  and  also  one  of  de- 
parture were  erected  in  Tripoli,  with  all  the  necessary 
apphances  and  offices. 

At  the  declaration  of  peace  60  kilometers  (40  miles) 
of  tracks  were  laid,  and  in  operation  there  were  4  loco- 
motives, I  train  of  first-  and  i  of  third-class  coaches,  12 
tank  cars,  62  box  and  flat  cars,  and  12  armored  cars. 

Even  in  the  ^gean,  roads  were  constructed.  On  the 
island  of  Rhodes,  from  Rhodes  to  Kum-Barnu  Trianta 
to  Fanes  (a  road  for  auto-trucks),  from  Rhodes  to  the 
fountains  of  Rodino  to  Kalitheas,  12  kilometers  (18 
miles).  Another  road  3  meters  (3^  yards)  wide  was 
paved  from  the  Bay  of  Trianta  to  Mount  Smith,  and 
then  down  into  Rhodes.  It  was  the  ancient  road  of 
Cavaliere,  which  had  been  reduced  to  a  path  in  spite  of 
its  being  the  most  direct  communication  between  Trianta 
and  Rhodes.  This  work,  finished  in  October,  was  long 
and  tedious,  the  bridges  and  retaining-walls  having  to  be 
repaired  or  rebuilt. 

At  Leros  the  detachment  stationed  there  repaired  the 
road  from  Partheni  to  S.  Marina  for  a  length  of  5  kilo- 
meters (3>2  miles). 

Telegraph  and  Telephone. 

As  has  been  stated  in  the  report  of  the  Engineer  Corps, 
the  telegraphic,  telephonic,  and  radio-telegraphic  commu- 


122  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

nication  installed  by  them,  for  immediate  military  pur- 
poses, was  only  the  forerunner  of  an  extensive  net  to  be 
established  and  that  would  prove  its  value  in  the  colony. 

Water  Mains. 

The  water  problem  was  one  of  the  gravest  faced 
during  the  war.  It  has  been  seen  how  in  the  beginning 
water  had  to  be  sent  from  Italy,  and  later  how  wells  were 
dug  and  water  sterilized  for  drinking  purposes. 

Gradually  this  problem  was  solved,  and  water  was 
furnished  for  the  inhabitants  as  well  as  the  troops. 

Little  could  be  done  around  Bu  Chemesc,  because  the 
water  was  brackish;  and  after  digging  loo  meters  (io8) 
yards)  and  not  finding  fresh  water,  this  project  was 
abandoned. 

In  the  peninsula  of  Macabez  the  water  was  fresh,  but 
did  not  reach  to  a  great  depth. 

At  Tripoli  the  sources  of  Bu  Meliana  were  cleaned  out 
and  the  existing  mains  were  renovated;  but  the  flow  of 
water  was  insufiicient  when  the  inhabitants  abandoned 
the  use  of  the  wells.  Work  is  in  progress  laying  mains 
from  Hamidiè  to  provide  water  for  Hara,  Sciara  Sciat,  and 
other  quarters  in  that  zone. 

At  Misurata  water  mains  and  a  power-plant  were  es- 
tablished, getting  water  from  the  wells  of  Mangush,  i8 
meters  (20  yards)  deep,  i  kilometer  (1,094  yards)  distant. 

At  Bengasi  plans  are  laid  to  get  water  from  the  wells 
of  Foeyat  and  to  construct  a  reservoir  of  200,000  liters 
(40,000  gallons) . 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  123 

At  Dema  the  best  water  exists.  Before  our  occupa- 
tion the  city  was  furnished  by  wells  and  two  uncovered 
aqueducts,  which  ran  along  the  valley  of  Dema;  the  one 
on  the  right  called  the  Seghia,  5  kilometers  (3^2  miles) 
from  the  city  and  53  meters  (57  yards)  above  the  sea 
level;  the  other,  on  the  left,  called  Bu  Mansur;  both 
from  distant  sources  not  yet  located.  From  the  first 
days  of  our  occupation  this  latter  aqueduct  was  de- 
stroyed by  the  Arab-Turks,  but  the  remaining  one  fur- 
nished enough  water  for  our  use.  To  prevent  the  de- 
struction of  this  one,  the  valley  was  dammed  and  the 
water  was  obtained  through  an  iron  pipe  leading  from 
this  wall. 

The  few  wells  and  sources  at  Tobruk  furnished  brackish 
water,  but  the  bad  results  were  negative.  It  is  expected 
that  good  water  will  soon  be  located  further  inland. 

Sanitary  and  Hygienic  Measures. 

The  sanitary  conditions  of  the  natives  were  bad, 
owing  to  the  lack  of  hygienic  and  curative  measures. 
They  were  provided,  gratuitously  in  all  the  garrisons, 
with  dispensaries,  either  detached  or  in  the  military 
hospitals,  and  even  in  the  regimental  infirmaries. 

The  natives,  at  first  diffident,  finally  began  to  report 
for  treatment  in  great  numbers  and  with  faith.  At  Homs 
from  15  to  20  per  day  at  first  reported,  and  finally  from 
60  to  80;  at  Misurata,  from  June  to  October,  5,000  sick 
were  cared  for;  and  at  Bengasi,  during  the  year  of  the 
war,  32,507. 


124  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

At  Rhodes  the  civil  and  marine  hospital  services  were 
in  a  position  to  attend  to  all  the  wants. 

In  Tripoli  this  free  treatment  had  to  be  reinforced,  the 
cholera  having  broken  out  among  the  natives  just  before 
we  landed. 

The  first  steps  taken  were  to  isolate  and  stamp  out 
this  epidemic.  The  military  sanitary  corps  worked  with 
great  intelligence  and  abnegation,  first  alone  and  then  in 
conjunction  with  the  civil  sanitary  corps.  Notwithstand- 
ing the  gravest  difficulties  experienced — the  scarcity  of 
potable  water,  the  filth  in  the  houses  and  streets,  and 
insufficient  and  unsuitable  means  to  cope  with  this  dis- 
ease, they  managed  to  eliminate  the  cholera  in  a  brief 
space  of  time. 

The  peril  from  cholera  having  diminished,  the  sanitary 
personnel  immediately  began  to  organize.  They  in- 
stalled two  laboratories,  one  chemical  and  one  bacterio- 
logical, with  all  the  means  and  instruments  necessary  to 
carry  on  their  respective  work.  They  could  therefore 
perform  and  render  the  same  service  as  any  laboratory  in 
the  mother  country.  To  prevent  contagious  diseases  and 
to  rapidly  stamp  them  out  in  case  they  manifested  them- 
selves, a  quarantine  station  was  established  in  all  the 
ports;  the  one  in  Tripoli  being  the  most  important,  as 
this  port  was  used  by  the  pilgrims  to  and  from  Mecca. 
In  case  of  an  epidemic,  those  afflicted  were  isolated  out- 
side of  the  city  in  a  hospital  of  150  beds.  Illness  of  a 
minor  character  was  taken  care  of  in  the  regular  hos- 
pitals.    The  laboratory  Baccelli,  created  by  the  Minister 


y'ii'iiUJL ...,,, 


r 


\  1.-,.  yjL  i  ii_.i.ain..w  1..1  -  -a. J  lieview  ol"  Troups. 


125 


BENCÌA61. — iort  at  riemonU), 


A  Company  of  Colonials. 


m 


Orphans  at  Exercise. 


126 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  127 

of  Foreign  Affairs  for  research  before  our  occupation, 
with  its  four  specialists,  did  excellent  and  conspicuous 
work  in  ophthalmia  and  diseases  of  the  ear,  nose,  and 
throat. 

To  organize  and  better  the  sanitary  and  hygienic  con- 
ditions of  the  natives,  doctors  were  detailed  to  live  in  the 
various  quarters,  to  see  that  decrees  relative  to  sanitation 
were  being  carried  out,  and  to  give  medical  aid. 

Various  Services. 

The  synthetic  character  of  this  writing  does  not  allow 
the  space  these  services  merit,  but  will  be  explained  in 
brief. 

Customs  and  tariff  were  imposed  or  reduced,  care 
being  taken  not  to  alarm  the  commerce  of  the  neutral 
nations;  keeping  account  of  the  local  exigencies,  and  not 
preventing  the  liberal  development  of  industr>^  com- 
bating, moreover,  the  excessive  use  of  alcoholic  drinks. 

The  port  officials  regulated  the  harbor  police,  fishing- 
boats,  maritime  rights  and  sanitation,  pilots,  landings, 
and  departures. 

Steps  were  taken  to  protect  and  till  the  tobacco  plan- 
tations and  promote  the  growth  of  Fezzan  and  Tripolitan 
tobacco. 

The  municipal  and  federal  establishments  were  reha- 
bilitated, having  been  left  by  the  Turks  in  complete 
abandon.  Civil  jails  and  prisons  were  constructed,  elec- 
tric lights  and  cars  installed,  streets  paved,  and  local  and 
suburban  police  organized. 


128  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

At  Tripoli  an  orphan  asylum  was  established,  where 
the  children  were  maintained  and  educated.  Steps  were 
taken  to  assist  the  poor,  who  had  become  more  numerous, 
due  to  the  misery  of  the  war. 

The  Exchange  was  organized;  illicit  speculations,  ex- 
cessive loans  from  banks,  illegal  acquirement  of  land,  and 
the  cutting  down  of  palms  prevented. 

Steps  were  taken  to  repopulate  and  cultivate  the 
oases,  with  pecuniary  encouragement  and  protection 
against  marauders,  who  were  a  menace  to  all  isolated 
grounds,  and  to  institute  agricultural  credit.  Excellent 
silk  is  raised  on  the  experimental  farms  established. 

Italian  schools  were  opened  as  soon  as  possible. 

In  the  interests  of  archaeology,  the  old  Roman  ruins 
around  Libya  are  being  excavated  under  the  supervision 
of  experts. 

The  service  of  the  poHce  was  at  first  rendered  by  the 
Carabiniere  (Italian  Royal  PoHce),  then  by  natives  under 
their  supervision. 

The  courts  of  justice  were  in  the  beginning  all  military. 
Later,  a  civil  tribunal  and  an  appellate  court  were  insti- 
tuted in  Tripoli. 

Our  good  intentions  were  demonstrated  to  the  Arabs, 
relative  to  the  new  colony,  and  the  comparison  made  be- 
tween the  old  and  new  regime,  the  removal  of  the  squalor, 
and  our  respect  for  their  traditions,  customs,  and  rehgious 
beliefs  by  distributing  lambs  for  their  rites,  and  repairing 
the  mosques  that  had  been  damaged  by  shells.  Flour 
was  furnished  gratuitously  and  periodically,  money  was 


*^V  O^i-v 


Orphans  at  School. 


129 


Orphans  at  Drill. 


Olive  Trees  at  Misurata — Shoemakers  in  the  Shade. 


TRIPOLI.— DrilUng  Recruits. 


130 


THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR.  131 

given  for  repair  of  houses  and  wells,  and  work-animals 
loaned.  Treaties  were  made  with  the  chiefs,  and  they 
were  given  administrative  rights  and  power  over  their 
tribes.  As  it  was  difficult  to  get  into  direct  communica- 
tion with  the  Arabs,  owing  to  the  vigilance  exercised  by 
the  Turks  over  our  emissaries,  proclamations  in  Arabic 
were  dropped  from  dirigibles  and  aeroplanes  into  Arab 
camps. 

The  Arabs  had  been  and  were  kept  in  the  dark  by  the 
Turks  as  to  the  developments  of  the  campaign,  our  vic- 
tories, our  intentions,  and  our  form  of  government,  in  the 
whole  theater  of  war. 

Conclusion. 

Our  recent  war,  due  to  the  condition  of  the  terrain, 
resources,  and  climate  of  the  hostile  country,  was  complex 
and  difficult.  The  work  completed  by  Italy,  by  means  of 
its  Army  and  Navy  and  supported  by  public  enthusiasm, 
can  be  said  to  be  truly  unique. 

The  accurate  and  sagacious  work  of  military  prepara- 
tion, the  valor  displayed  in  combat,  and  for  the  fruitful 
civil  rights  established  in  our  antique  Roman  colony,  is 
destined,  under  the  activity  of  our  people,  to  be  given  a 
new  and  religious  life. 

His  Majesty  the  King  issued  the  following  order: 
"Order  of  the  Day  to  the  Army  and  Navy. 
"S.  Rossore,  2Qth  October,  igi2. 
"In  the  solemn  proof,  to  which  Italy  was  called  by  her 


132  THE  ITALO-TURKISH  WAR. 

new  destinies,  the  Army  and  Navy  have  worthily  ac- 
complished their  proper  duty. 

"They  were  put  to  the  test  on  land  and  sea,  and  were 
found  prepared,  ably  directed  by  chiefs,  and  valorous  in 
combat.  The  happy  result  was  merited  and  was  a  con- 
sequence of  the  activity  and  intelligent  cooperation  of  all, 
the  abnegation,  the  calm  patience  with  which  the  perils 
and  discomforts  were  serenely  confronted,  the  sacrifice 
of  noble  lives  with  enthusiastic  loyalty  devoted  to  their 
country. 

"Glory  to  those  who  fell  for  the  grandeur  of  Italy. 

"To  the  Army  and  Navy,  who  fraternally  united  in 
this  arduous  enterprise  and  worthily  impersonated  the 
national  conscience,  falls  the  warmest  expression  of  my 
most  heartfelt  gratitude  and  the  loyal  applause  of  a 
grateful  country." 

On  the  19th  of  January,  19 13,  the  troops  passed  in 
review  before  His  Majesty;  the  flags  of  all  the  corps  were 
then  escorted  to  the  monument  of  Vittorio  Emanuele  II., 
"The  Altar  of  the  Country,"  and  decorated  by  the  King. 


Arab  l-*risoners. 


133 


King  of  Italy  Decorating  the  Colors. 


LITANIA 

:  1.500.000 


regione    Jegii  O'ieila 


MISURATA 

Scala   appr    1  :  250.000 


Zarrytg 


TRIPOLITANIA 


i'»>^I.''r. 


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TRIPOLI   E   DINTORNI 


UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 

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AA    000  902  415    9 


